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ABSTRACT
The individual tax compliance gap persists despite
costly enforcement efforts that attempt to dissuade
noncompliance by identifying noncompliant taxpayers and
imposing sanctions on those identified.

Enforcement

strategies that reduce the psychological incentives of
noncompliance may complement the dissuasive approach.

The

present study probes this psychological alternative by
examining several factors that are potential determinants of
how taxpayers perceive their tax return results, and
accordingly, how much reporting risk they are willing to
assume.
Noncompliance is modelled as a two-tier process.

The

first relies on adaptation level theory that suggests
taxpayers frame the filing of their current year tax returns
with respect to the tax consequences of prior years'
returns.

The second relies on prospect theory that suggests

taxpayers in loss frames are more risk prone (noncompliant)
than those in gain frames.
Sixty-four taxpayers participated in an experiment used
to test the noncompliance model.

Participant expectations

were based on their individual prior tax return liabilities
and refund status amounts.

The task presented them with

current year "estimates” that reflected increased or
decreased liabilities with respect to prior amounts and
increased or decreased refunds or additional amounts of tax
v

owed with respect to these prior measures.

Subjects rated

their satisfaction with the estimates and their inclinations
to modify the current returns to include ambiguous
deductions.
Results are supportive of both tiers of the model.
Increases in tax liability, decreases in refund amounts, and
increases in additional tax owed induce loss frames.
Changes in the opposite directions induce gain frames.
Taxpayers in loss frames are more inclined to include
ambiguous deductions than those in gain frames.

Cash

position, the presumed framing determinant in previous
studies, induces gain and loss framing, respectively, when
there is a refund due and when additional tax is owed.

The

effects of frame on risk diminish over time although
reported frame intensity does not appear to decline.
Implications for formulating policy that may minimize
changes and statuses that induce loss frames are discussed.
Suggestions for further research regarding framing and
timing are made.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduc tion

The estimated amount of tax revenue lost through
noncompliance with the tax laws has tripled in the past ten
years and has increased from $88 billion to $119 billion
over the past five years (Smith et al. 1994).

Two-thirds

of this deficit is attributed to individual taxpayers
(Smith et al. 1994).

Noncompliance includes taxpayer

filing decisions (including decisions not to file) that are
explicitly in violation of tax law.

The Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) also includes reporting choices that result
from taxpayer-favorable interpretations of ambiguous tax
law but that differ from the interpretations of the IRS.
The former constitutes tax evasion; the latter, tax
avoidance.

Since both evasive and avoidance filing

decisions have a probability of resulting in additional
taxpayer payments of unpaid tax, interest, and penalties,
they may be categorized as "aggressive" (risky) taxpayer
postures.

The resilience of aggressive reporting to both

legal sanctions and to noncompliance detection efforts,
which consume nearly two-thirds of the $5 billion IRS
budget (IRS 1990), is evidenced by the persistence of the
compliance gap.
The present study examines taxpayer motivation for
noncompliance, to assess the feasibility of implementing
1
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complementary enforcement strategies that may reduce, on
average, the motivation to assume aggressive reporting
postures.

This chapter briefly discusses the traditional

tax enforcement mechanism.
approach used in this study.

It develops the alternative
Finally, it presents the

research questions.
The Traditional Tax Bnforcement Meehaniam
Sanctions as Deterrents
Tax enforcement relies on the effectiveness of legal
sanctions (economic and punitive penalties) in deterring
the assumption of aggressive filing postures.

Legal

penalties range from small fines to imprisonment terms.
Recent years have witnessed stiffened penalties for both
taxpayers and tax preparers (Wilde 1988) despite the
nonlinear relationship between the severity of a sanction
and its deterrence effect.

For instance, Tittle (1980),

Christiansen (1980), and Friedland (1982) provide evidence
of a threshold effect whereby, given a threshold
probability of detection, a mild punishment may be as
effective a deterrent as a more severe one.

Further,

sanctions that are perceived as too severe may elicit
complete disregard for the law; moonshining during
Prohibition illustrates this phenomenon (Jackson and
Milliron 1986).
In reviewing 18 studies that have examined the
relationship between sanctions and tax compliance (Jackson
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and Milliron 1986), sanctions have been found to deter
noncompliance in ten of the studies.

Only two found an

adverse effect of sanctions upon compliance, and the
remaining six studies found no effect.

Interestingly, two

of the studies (Grasmick and Scott 1982, and Schwartz and
Orleans 1967) found that the threat of guilt feelings is a
stronger deterrent to noncompliance than are legal
sanctions.

Overall, research results have corroborated the

effectiveness of the sanction mechanism in deterring
noncompliance.

However, it suggests that further

increasing the severity of sanctions may result in no
improvement in the level of compliance or, at the extreme,
give rise to adverse consequences.
Identification of Noncompliers
Enforcement efforts focus on the identification of
specific taxpayer types who are likely to assume aggressive
reporting stances despite the deterrence structure.

For

almost two decades the IRS has employed some 64 indexes of
noncompliance to expedite the detection of those who file
aggressively (IRS 1978).

These include socio-economic

variables among which, to name a few, are age, gender,
education, income, and complexity of return.
Presently, the IRS is expanding its enforcement
structure and establishing 31 District Offices of Research
and Analysis (DORA's) that will target enforcement efforts
at specific taxpaying market segments (Harms 1995).

For
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example, taxpayers with common sources of income (e.g.,
self-employment) or similar occupations (e.g., plumbers,
carpenters, restauranteurs) may define a market segment.
The DORA mission's objective is to study various market
segments to identify those that have low compliance rates
and then to direct enforcement efforts and taxpayer
education programs toward those specific segments.

The

Service is building a database of filed returns, beginning
with the 1992 tax year, to expedite identification of
noncompliant segments (Harms 1995).

Identification of

nonfilers is also on the IRS's agenda.

At this time the

Service is unsure of the tact these efforts will take since
nonfilers elude visibility (Harms 1995) .
Research results have partially validated the IRS's
indexes of noncompliance, but overall results are mixed.
For instance, numerous studies have examined the age
variable.

Tittle (1980) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982)

have found that older taxpayers are more compliant.
However, several studies (e.g., Milliron 1985, Spicer and
Becker 1980, and Spicer 1974) have found no relationship
between age and noncompliance.

The findings of Clotfelter

(1983) suggest a curvilinear relationship between the two,
wherein the youngest and eldest taxpaying segments are more
compliant than those in between.
Practically all studies examining the gender variable
have found males to be less compliant than females.

One
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exception is Friedland, Maital, and Rutenburg (1978) that
found women less compliant than men.

This study, however,

used Israeli students as subjects and it is possible that
the attitudes of the females in the group were less
conservative than their U.S. counterparts.

If generational

attitudes underlie the gender/noncompliance relationship,
as hypothesized by Tittle (1980), it is plausible that the
attitudes of both genders are converging as non-traditional
women emerge (Grasmick, Finley, and Glaser 1984).
The education variable refers to the taxpayer's
technical ability to comprehend and comply with the tax
laws (IRS 1976).

Westat (1980) found that 35 percent of

his taxpayer sample had misconceptions about tax laws, thus
suggesting that noncompliance would be a reasonable
expectation from this taxpaying segment.

Lewis (1982)

concurs with the rationale that misconceptions breed
noncompliance.

However, taxpayers who are well versed in

tax law have the where-with-all to recognize and seize
noncompliance opportunities.

Accordingly, a positive

relationship between education and noncompliance has been
found by Witte and Woodbury (1985) and by Chang (1984) .
Thus, it appears uncertain whether highly educated or
poorly educated taxpayers are more likely to be
noncompliers.
Investigations of the income variable have produced
mixed results.

Approximately one-half the studies
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examining the relationship between income level and
compliance have found that high income taxpayers are most
compliant and the other one-half have found that low income
taxpayers are most compliant.

Mason and Lowry (1981) and

Witte and Woodbury (1985) complete the spectrum by finding
that middle income taxpayers are most compliant.

Witte and

Woodbury (1985) suggests that the relationship is
curvilinear, but Frank and Dekeyser-Meulders (1977)
suggests that the confounding variables of income source
and occupation account for the mixed findings.

These

confounding variables are very closely related to
opportunity for noncompliance, as is complexity of return,
the next factor to be discussed.
Complexity has been argued to aid "playing the tax
lottery" (New York State Bar Association 1972), that is,
taxpayers' taking the chance that undercompliance will
remain undetected and thus result in the payment of lower
taxes.

It has also been argued to enhance compliance by

increasing taxpayer uncertainty (Westat 1980).

Research

has found complexity a significant variable in
noncompliance, but that its directional impact depends upon
opportunity for noncompliance (Milliron 1985).

Clotfelter

(1983) and Witte and Woodbury (1985) have found complexity
associated with greater underreporting for nonbusiness tax
returns, but not for business tax returns.

This finding

suggests that business returns provide a sufficient
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opportunity for underreporting, whereas complexity is
essential to noncompliance opportunity for nonbusiness
returns where there is withholding at the income source.
Numerous studies (e.g., Slemrod 1985, Witte and Woodbury
1985, and Clotfelter 1983) have found opportunity to be the
most important explanatory factor in noncompliance.
There is no strong research support for the IRS's
indexes of noncompliance.

All of the variables associate

at times with noncompliance, and at other times, they do
not.

The foregoing brief discussions of five of the 64

variables are representative of research results overall
and are inconclusive, except perhaps for the related
opportunity variable, which appears robust.

The IRS's

current restructuring efforts are, at least in part,
aligned with research results in that certain market
segments may have greater opportunity for noncompliance
than other segments.
Enforcement Summarized
The progress to date in the tax compliance area has
been restricted to the disincentive aspect of
noncompliance, that is, to legislating further deterrents
(stiffening sanctions) and specifically identifying those
who are not dissuaded by impending sanctions.

Research

results support the use of sanctions (deterrents) and are
descriptive of noncompliant taxpayers.

Overall, however,

the socio-economic profile of the noncompliant taxpayer is
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inconclusive.

This suggests that the use of socio-economic

variables to detect noncompliance introduces considerable
error into the identification process.
An Alternative Approach
Underexploited Variables
Research has further examined the role of
psychological variables in noncompliance.

These include,

for example, peer compliance perceptions, deterrence system
perceptions, and taxpayer framing.

Although perceptual

variables have been shown to associate with the degree of
compliance, they have found little place in the enforcement
process because taxpayer perceptions elude definition and
measurement.

They are unobservable from filed returns and

the determinants of taxpayer perceptions remain
unidentified.
Numerous studies {e.g., Collins, Milliron, and Toy
1992, Witte and Woodbury 1985, Geerken and Gove 1975, and
Vogel 1974) have consistently found that higher rates of
evasion prevail when taxpayers perceive peers as
noncompliant.

PerhapB when taxpayers believe they have

peer approval for assuming aggressive postures they are
more inclined to do so.

Those who believe peers are

compliant are less likely to take reporting risks, perhaps
because they do not wish to chance the disapproval of their
peers.

Thus, perceptions of the standards of others may

serve to foster or restrain noncompliance.

Deterrence system perceptions potentially include
taxpayers' assessments of two probabilities; these are the
probabilities of detection and of the imposition of
sanctions.

Noncompliant taxpayers perceive a lower chance

of detection than compliant taxpayers (Collins, Mi11iron,
and Toy 1992, Mason and Lowry 1981, Tittle 1980, Minor
1978, and Vogel 19 74).

Taxpayer perceptions regarding the

likelihood of the imposition of sanctions have not been
found significant except for subjects with precise
information about actual probabilities (Spicer and Thomas
1982).

These results concur with other studies that have

directly compared the relative importances of the two
levels and found that the probability of apprehension
outweighs the sanctions imposed (Lempert 1982, Erickson and
Gibbs 1976, and Tittle and Logan 1973).

Thus, deterrence

system perceptions appear to influence the extent of tax
compliance.
A decision frame is the decision-maker's "conception
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a
particular choice" (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) .
Accordingly, taxpayers may frame reporting decisions as
favorable or unfavorable, or as gains or losses, depending
on their overall assessment of the decisions' consequences
to themselves.

Studies investigating the relationship

between taxpayer frame and noncompliance have generally
found that taxpayers in loss frames are less compliant than
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those in gain frames (e.g., Chang, Nichols, and Schultz
1987, Chang 1984, and Clotfelter 1983).

An expanded

discussion of framing studies will be presented in
Chapter 2.
Rationale
Given that noncompliance occurs when incentives to
file aggressively override deterrents (National Academy of
Sciences 1989), and that enforcement efforts to date have
focused almost exclusively on posing additional and more
stringent deterrents, it may be possible to broaden
enforcement strategies to reduce the noncompliance
incentives.

Strategies that reduce noncompliance

incentives may effectively complement the current
strategies that focus on deterrents.

Unrealistic as it may

be to expect to influence socio-economic taxpayer
attributes that associate with aggressive filing postures,
psychological variables may be more susceptible to
manipulation.

Kinsey's (1984) observation that

"noncompliance exists at the intersection of perceived
facts and perceived law” suggests that taxpayer perceptions
are paramount and enforcement strategies introduced at the
perceptual level may be effective.

To formulate strategies

that exert the desired influence on taxpayer perceptions,
it is necessary to isolate the factors in the taxpaying
environment that induce the taxpayer perceptions that are
conducive to noncompliance.

Such factors, once identified,
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may then be able to be mitigated or eliminated, thus
demotivating aggressive reporting.

Reductions in

noncompliance motivation could be expected to reduce the
aggregate level of risk taking in tax reporting and
complement the traditional deterrence mechanism to narrow
the overall compliance gap.
Based on the foregoing rationale, the present study is
seeking clarification of the relationship between the
character (gain or loss) of taxpayer frame and aggressive
reporting.

Further, it is attempting to isolate contextual

factors that characterize taxpayer frame as gain or loss
and that may be manipulated to induce frames that are
conducive to compliant reporting.
The Research Questions
The first research question that will be addressed
is:

How does the character (gain or loss) of taxpayer

frame affect the level of risk taxpayers assume in making
tax reporting decisions?

To explore this question the

present study relies on prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979), which will be discussed in Chapter 2.

The

second research question and the primary thrust of this
study is:

What variables in the taxpaying context induce

the character (gain or loss) of frame that increases tax
reporting risk propensity?

The theoretical basis for

investigating this question will be adaptation level theory
(Kahneman and Varey 1989), which also will be discussed in
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Chapter 2.

Insight into these research questions may

enable the formulation of enforcement strategies that
manipulate contextual variables so that they induce
taxpayer frames of the type that promote risk-aversion and,
in turn, a higher level of tax compliance.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The framing literature is pertinent to the present
study.

An individual may frame a decision choice as either

a gain or a loss, depending on how (favorably or
unfavorably, respectively) the decision's consequences are
perceived by the individual.

Specifically in the case of

taxpayers, reporting decision alternatives that are
perceived to result in taxpayer-favorable consequences may
be framed as gains; those that would impose taxpayerunfavorable consequences may be framed as losses.
How frame affects taxpayer assessments of expected
outcomes and ultimately how these assessments drive choices
among risk-variant reporting alternatives is suggested by
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

However,

studies that have examined the applicability of prospect
theory in tax compliance are inconclusive, very likely
because the character (gain or loss) of frame has been
misspecified.

The character of frame depends on whether the

individual views an outcome as better (gain) or worse (loss)
than some mental benchmark that the individual perceives as
his/her neutral condition (norm). This mental benchmark is
the individual's framing reference point and it is not
necessarily zero.

Because taxpayers are diverse, reference
13
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points are likely to differ among taxpayers.

Prior studies

have presumed identical reference points for all subjects,
specifically, zero-refund status.

This presumed reference

point may often have been erroneous, and frames intended to
be of a specific character may have been the opposite.
Hence, frames may have been misspecified in prior studies
(e.g., Dusenbury 1994, White et al. 1993, Robben et al .
1990, and Schepanski and Kelsey 1990).

The use of

misspecified frames in the statistical tests of these
studies may have precluded consistent validation of the
frame/risk relationship predicted by prospect theory.
Also relevant to the present study is the psychological
literature that offers some theoretical basis for the
selection of the taxpayer reference point.

Kahneman and

Tversky's (1979) seminal work states that "the past and
present context of experience defines an adaptation level,
or reference point."

Accordingly, adaptation level theory

(Kahneman and Varey 1989) will be relied upon in the present
study to define the taxpayer reference point and further to
test contextual factors for their contributions to this
framing benchmark.
This chapter first discusses prospect theory.

It then

reviews prior studies that have tested prospect theory in a
tax context.

Third, it discusses adaptation level theory,

which may clarify the ambiguities encountered in prior

15
studies.

Finally, this chapter integrates prospect theory

and adaptation level theory into the framework of the
present research.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) furnishes a
descriptive model of decision-making under risk.

It was

proposed to explain decision choices that appear to violate
the axioms of expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern
1947).

Prospect theory posits that gambles (prospects) are

evaluated subjectively, in contrast to objective valuations
of expected payoffs that are the products of the payoff
amounts times their probabilities of realization.

For

instance, a 20 percent chance of winning $500 and a 50
percent chance of winning $200 both have expected payoffs of
$100, since ($500 x .20) * ($200 x .50) - $100.

Under

prospect theory, the former expected outcome would be
evaluated as ($500Vi x .20pi) , and the latter, as ($200va x
.50pa), where the v's are subjective weightings of payoff
amounts and the p's are subjective weightings of their
probabilities.

Differences between weighting factors used

in the two prospect theory computations would result in
different valuations of alternatives and would explain why a
decision-maker may reveal a preference for one of these
alternatives, rather than exibiting indifference, as should
result if expected payoffs were compared.
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Prospect theory does not propose an alternative to
utility maximization.

Instead, it defines utility on gains

and losses {changes in wealth or welfare) rather than on
final asset positions (Kahneman and Tversky 197 9).

It

furnishes an alternative evaluation modification to expected
utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Rankings of

alternatives resulting under subjective valuations would be
expected to differ from those determined objectively by a
computation of expected payoffs.

Thus, if individuals weigh

alternatives subjectively, choices would likely differ from
those that would be made on the basis of expected payoff
comparisons, but yet remain within the purview of utility
maximizat ion.
The Value and Weighting Functions
Under prospect theory, the value factor (payoff amount
times value weighting) is a function of the individual's
psychological frame, which may be categorically defined as
either gain (favorable, winning) or loss (unfavorable,
losing) with respect to the individual's psychologically
neutral reference point.

Prospect theory's value function

is assymetric over the gain and loss domains.

Specifically,

it is concave over the gain domain, convex over the loss
domain, and steeper for losses than for gains.

Compared to

expected payoffs which are linear (and thus symmetric),
individuals in gain frames would be apt to undervalue
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expected payoffs, and in loss frames, to overvalue them.
Figure 1 graphically depicts prospect theory's value
function on the same set of axes as the expected payoff
function; differences in outcome valuations under these two
valuation alternatives (subjective versus objective) may be
observed and contrasted for the two domains. A comparison
of expected payoffs (dashed line) to prospect valuations
(solid line) shows that, except for marginal gain states
(slightly to the right of the vertical axis which represents
neutrality), individuals in gain frames undervalue expected
payoffs, and in loss frames, overvalue them.

Thus,

according to the theory, losses loom larger than gains.
The weighting factor (probability times subjective
weighting) is generally lower than the probability of
occurrence since subjective weights between zero and one are
presumed used by the decision-maker, except for very low or
very high probabilities where the relationship is uncertain.
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical weighting function and also
the objective probability component of the function.

For

practically all probabilities, the weighting function (solid
line) undercuts the probability function (dashed line).

For

very small probabilities, the weighting function exceeds the
actual probability (crossover of the two plots of Figure 2),
and for very large probabilities, the weighting function is
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uncertain.

Accordingly, the weighting function is not

plotted for probabilities approaching 1 .0 .
The Frame/Risk Relationship
The assymetry of prospect theory's value function
across the loss and gain domains (Figure 1) implies that
risk reversals are exhibited by individuals in loss frames
versus those in gain frames.

This phenomenon is termed the

reflection effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

A comparison

of the steeper slope of the function in the loss domain to
the more gentle slope in the gain domain reveals that,
overall, an incremental unit of loss would be perceived as
greater than an incremental unit of gain.

Put another way,

a loss decrement of x units would be viewed as more valuable
than a gain increment of x units.

Individuals with an

impending loss would be willing to risk more to offset their
loss than individuals with an impending gain would be
willing to risk to increase their gain by an equivalent
amount.

Thus, prospect theory's risk prediction is that

individuals in loss frames are more risk-prone than
individuals in gain frames.
Applicability in Non-tax Areas
Prospect theory has been examined in a number of non
tax choice contexts.

These include areas involving direct

monetary consequences such as gambling and capital markets
investing.

Also included are areas involving indirect
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monetary consequences, such as participative budgeting, and
nonmonetary consequences, such as patient choices of medical
alternatives.

Although an exhaustive discussion of non-tax

studies testing the validity of prospect theory is not
entertained here, the following studies provide evidence
that the theory's risk predictions have received support in
a wide range of contexts.
In repeated gamble experiments. Leopard (1978) found
that subjects were more inclined to take risks when they
were ''behind” than when they were "ahead”. This finding
supports prospect theory's risk prediction that individuals
in loss frames are more risk-prone than individuals in gain
frames.

Metzger's (1985) field study of horse track betting

found that more speculative (risky) bets are placed in later
races than earlier ones on any one day.

Again this suggests

that losers (the expected aggregate condition as the day
wears on) are relatively risk prone.
Both Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) and Shefrin and
Statman (1985) examined capital markets trades.

These

studies provide evidence that investors sell winning stocks
too early and hold losing stocks too long.

Such behaviors

reflect the respective risk propensities (aversion and
proneness) predicted by prospect theory's value function.
Kim (1992) examined the effect of decision frame, as
well as dispositional risk, on the amount of slack built
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into participative budget revisions.

The introduction of

the framing variable extended previous research that had
considered only subject-specific dispositional risk (Waller
1988 and Young 1985).

Kim (1992) found that participants

who were already over-budget (in lose frames) at the time of
budgetary revisions incorporated less slack in the revised
hours to completion than those who were under-budget (in
gain frames). This finding concurs with the prediction of
risk-aversion for individuals in gain frames, since the
inclusion of slack provides insurance against unforseen
contingencies that may threaten their overall gain status.
Losers opted to allow fewer hours for the completion of the
task, thereby assuming an even greater risk of finishing
over-budget, but taking the long shot at making up for their
excess time-to-date when the total task time would be
tallied.
Framing studies in a medical context have found that
choices among alternative treatments may be influenced by
the physician's perspective that is conveyed in the
presentation of treatment alternatives.

Kahneman and

Tversky (1984), McNeil et al. (1982), and Eraker and Sox
(1981) found that treatment choices differed depending on
how alternatives were verbally presented.

For example, when

alternatives were framed as gains (in terms of the number of
people who would be saved by a given therapy), the majority
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(72 percent) opted for the certain (riskless) alternative of
saving 200 lives rather than the uncertain alternative that
had a one-third probability of saving 600 lives and a twothirds probability of saving no lives.

Conversely, when the

identical alternatives were framed as losses (in terms of
the number of people who would die as a result of a given
therapy), 78 percent opted for the risky (second)
alternative.

Although the end-states were identical under

the two framing scenarios, the decided differences in risk
propensities that emerged were dependent upon how the
alternatives were framed and these risk propensities
concurred with the risk predictions of prospect theory.
Prospect Thsory and Tax Compliance
The applicability of prospect theory in tax compliance
has been examined using archival data and further,
empirically via the use of human subjects/taxpayers.
Overall, the results are encouraging but inconclusive.

This

section discusses three archival studies and the primary
empirical studies.

It concludes with a discussion of the

probable weaknesses in these studies that may explain the
ambiguous findings.
Archival Studies
The initial evidence that prospect theory may be
applicable in tax compliance was provided by archival
studies using large IRS databases.

Clotfelter (1983) used
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the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) to
examine the relationship between the voluntary compliance
rate (VCR) as assessed by IRS audit and marginal tax rates.
Although the research question did not specifically address
withholding status at filing time, Clotfelter (1983)
reported that taxpayers who owed additional tax payments at
upon filing (losers) had lower VCR's than other taxpayers.
Thus, it appeared that losers assumed more aggressive filing
postures than winners.
Using the 1984 TCMP files, Chang and Schultz (1990)
replicated Clotfelter's (1983) findings.

This study's

specific objective was to test the relationship between
withholding status and compliance rate.

Although Chang and

Schultz (1990) did find that taxpayers who owed additional
tax were generally less compliant than those who were due a
refund, the study also found an interraction between source
of income with withholding position.

Chang and Schultz

(1990) concluded that other variables, both unobservable and
uncontrollable in archival data, may also confound the
relationship of interest and conclusive evidence would be
obtainable only through experimental studies.
Dusenbury (1992) used data from the IRS's 1985 Tax
Modal File to explore the reason why between 7 5 and 80
percent of all taxpayers prepay more tax than the amount
minimally required throughout the year.

One hypothesis was
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that the widespread withholding mechanism induces a gain
frame and thus risk aversion which could explain the
overpayments.

The link between withholding and frame was

based on Thaler's (1985) articulation of prospect theory
that each dollar paid at filing time (perceived as a loss)
has a larger negative value than than each dollar never
received because of payroll withholding (net income would
still be perceived as a gain).

Dusenbury (1992) expected to

find that participants in payroll withholding had
significantly higher prepayment levels than other taxpayers
and that the withholding mechanism may thus account for the
excess prepayments.

Significance was found for six out of

sixteen tests, thus providing some supporting evidence,
albeit inconclusive, for prospect theory's risk predictions.
Empirical Studies
Chang et al. (1987) was the first experimental study to
examine whether taxpayers are generally risk-averse as
predicted by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) axioms.

The

overwhelming majority of the 56 subjects exhibited riskaversion.

However, when the subjects were partitioned on

the basis of whether they viewed tax payments as reductions
of gains or as certain losses, those who viewed taxes as
losses chose to underreport hypothetical income
significantly more often than the others.

Thus emerged the

first experimental support for prospect theory's frame/risk
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relationship.

This study, however, offered no insight as to

why or how certain taxpayers framed taxpaying as a gain
while other taxpayers framed it as a loss.

The study was

further limited by the unrealistic, hypothetical amounts
presented to the sparse number of subjects.
Encouraged by Clotfelter (1983) and Chang et al.
(1987), subsequent experimental studies have probed framing
and the taxpayer frame/risk relationship.

In so doing,

these studies have attempted gain and loss frame induction
for the subjects.

Table 2.1 summarizes selected aspects of

the five most recently published experimental studies.
Noteworthy is that support for the theory's risk predictions
is partial and inconsistent, despite considerable
consistency in reference point presumptions and framing
techniques across these studies.
Table 2.1
Summary of Experimental Studies
STUDY

RIBK/nLMCS riMDItras

u m m c s
MIR

ntAMlNO

Duaenbury
(1994)

Supportive at the $37,000
incone level

Caeh Poaition

Manipulated

Robben at a l .
(1990)

Supportive only whan all
atudiea pooled

Caah Poaition

Manipulated
fc Meaaured

Schadewald
(1919)

Supportive only when both
studies aggreqated

Caeh fc Accrual
Foeitione

Manipulated

Schepanaki (•
Xalaay (1990)

Supportive only for low
detection ratea

Caah Poaition

Manipulated

Whlta at al.
(1993)

Supportive only for high
detection rataa t penaltiaa

Caah Poaition

Manipulated 1

I
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Dusenbury (1994) found the expected frame/risk
relationship for taxpayers facing a hypothetical income
level of about $27,000, which was held constant for all
subjects.

The findings, although supportive of the

predicted frame/risk relationship, may not be generalizable
to other income levels and/or may have resulted by chance.
Schadewald (1989) failed to detect the expected relationship
in either of two separate experiments but did find it when
the two groups were analyzed as an aggregate.

Robben et al .

(1990) conducted studies in the USA and in five foreign
countries.

Although the expected frame/risk relationship

was not detected in any of the separate studies, this
relationship was significant (as predicted by prospect
theory) in a pooled analysis of all the studies which, in
total, included over 600 subjects.

The relationship was

found by Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) for low, but not for
high, detection rates; by White et al. (1993) for high, but
not for low, detection rates, and also for high, but not
low, penalty rates.
Among specific studies, supportive results have a
randomly occurring flavor.

However, they are consistently

supportive in the aggregate analyses that increased the size
of the sample under scrutiny.

This observation suggests

that the individual studies lacked the power to detect
consistently the relationship of interest.

A lack of power
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would not likely be attributable to omitted variables (the
primary weakness in the archival studies) since the
experimental context attempts to control for confounding
factors.

Therefore, a comparison of the experimental

manipulations employed in these studies may suggest
commonalities that are potential sources of reduced power.
In four of the studies (Dusenbury 1994, Robben et a l .
1990, Schepanski and Kelsey 1990, and White et a l. 1993) the
only reference point employed to characterize frame as gain
or loss was the taxpayer cash position at filing time.
Accordingly, tax refunds were presumed to induce gain frames
and additional tax payments owed were expected to induce
loss frames.

The selection and use of the cash position

followed the precedent set by the archival studies that were
large-sample studies.

In the archival studies, any

misspecification of this reference point may have been
subsumed by the comparatively greater statistical power
afforded by their larger sample sizes.
Schadewald (1989) expanded reference point
possibilities to include subjects' expected tax liabilities.
Under this alternative, unexpected refunds and unexpected
additional tax payments owed at filing time were expected to
be perceived as gains and losses, respectively.
Schadewald's extension contemplated differences in
taxpayers' mental orientations.

Specifically, taxpayers may
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have a "cash” orientation and respond only to cash refunds
or additional payments upon filing, or taxpayers may have an
"accrual" orientation and respond to unexpected changes in
refund status resulting from unexpected changes in tax
liability.

For example, a taxpayer who expected a tax

liability of $5,000 and a corresponding refund amount of
$500 would perhaps perceive a loss condition if a $5,300
actual tax liability resulted and, correspondingly, reduced
the refund amount to $200.

In contrast, a taxpayer having a

"cash" orientation and a zero-refund reference point would
perceive the same $200 refund as a gain condition.
Schadewald (1989) examined the frame/risk relationship in
separate experiments for these two alternative reference
points and did not find significance in either of them
alone.
All of the five studies presented hypothetical tax
situations to subjects and required them to choose between
conservative and aggressive filing alternatives.

The

presentation to subjects of hypothetical dollar amounts of
refunds and additional payments owed were intended to induce
gain frames if the taxpayers were to receive a refund and
loss frames if the taxpayers owed additional tax.
Statistical tests were performed on the basis of the
manipulated frames.

Only Robben et al. (1990) also tested

the frame/risk relationship using subject-reported frames.
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These measured frames often differed from manipulated frames
and the results of the tests using the measured frames were
supportive of prospect theory whereas those using
manipulated frames were not.
Frame/Reference Point (Mis)Specification
The primary weaknesses in the foregoing studies and the
most plausible explanations for their mixed results are
suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in the statement
that prospect value is a function of both (1) the position
of the reference point and (2) the magnitude (positive or
negative) of the change from that reference point.

The

reference point has been presumed to be zero-refund status
in all the studies except one of Schadewald's (1989) two
experiments.

Justification for this break-even reference

point originated with the Westat (1980) reasoning that
people do not miss what they never have (withheld amounts)
but miss much more any extra tax that must be paid when
their returns are filed.

Thus, refunds resulting from over

withholding would be viewed as gains and additional tax
payments resulting from under-withholding would be viewed as
losses.

The leap from withheld tax to all tax prepayments

(such as estimated tax payments) has been based on anecdotal
evidence from tax practitioners and taxpayers (Chang and
Schultz 1990) . Based on such tenuous reasoning, the
remaining studies in this area [except part of Schadewald
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(1989) as noted above] have accepted the zero-refund
position as the most likely and natural reference point for
cash-basis taxpayers.
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) explanation that the past
and present context of experience defines a reference point
and Robben et al.'s (1990) discovery that manipulated and
measured frames often differed brings into question
anecdotal acceptance of the cash position reference point.
It is unlikely that all taxpayers recurringly break-even or
expect to break-even at filing time.

Some taxpayers

habitually elect prepayment schemes that assure a tax refund
at filing and others pay in the minimum required to avoid an
underpayment penalty, practically assuring that additional
tax will be owed at filing time.

It is therefore reasonable

that reference points would differ among taxpayers with
diverse prepayment strategy preferences and would differ
from zero.

Thus, is is likely that the use of cash position

as the taxpayer reference point is a misspecification.
Even if the reference point were correctly specified
(and with certainty if it were not), subjects' perceptions
of the magnitude of the change from the reference point
would likely vary under experimental conditions where
specific and fixed amounts were used for all subjects.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) further indicate that identical
amounts "may imply abject poverty for one person and great
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riches for another.”

Experimental studies presented

identical dollar amounts to all subjects in any one
treatment group.

Given diverse income levels and wealth

states among taxpayers, it is unlikely that fixed amounts
were equally salient to all subjects {if salient at all) or
perceived by all subjects as equivalent departures from the
alleged reference point.
Schadewald's (1909) examination of the alternative
reference point, taxpayer expectations, may also have been
sub-salient.

Subjects were told what total tax liability

they had expected and what tax liability actually resulted,
and again, the amounts were fixed across subjects in the
same treatment groups.

Although expectations may be a

viable alternative to the break-even point, the manner in
which this reference point was operationalized may have
resulted in non-salience to the subjects and misspecified
frames may have resulted.
The types of weaknesses pervading all the literature to
date that may explain the mixed results may be summarized as
misspecified frames resulting from misspecified reference
points and/or the use of dollar amounts that were neither
salient to nor perceived equivalent by all subjects.

Unless

the taxpayer reference point is identified, taxpayer frames
can neither be assessed nor manipulated in the tax
enforcement process, and the application potential of
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prospect theory remains underexploited.

In search of a

theoretically sound, taxpayer-specific reference point,
consideration of taxpaying experience in reference point
determination appears essential.

Adaptation level theory

(Kahneman and Varey 1989), which incorporates the role of
prior experiences into the formulation of the "norm" or
reference point, affords a theoretical basis for reference
point selection.
Adaptation Laval Thaory
Adaptation contemplates modifications in an organism in
response to maintained exposure to environmental changes
(Random House 1991).

This concept underlies adaptation

level theory (Helson 1964), which describes the process with
respect to sensory phenomena.

Sensory adaptation has been

evidenced in response to maintained states, such as to
continuous auditory, olfactory, or tactile stimulation
(Thompson and Spencer 1966).

An individual thus exposed

experiences a decreasing response to the state until
complete adaptation has occurred.

At that point, there is

no response; the state has become the individual's "norm,"
or condition of neutrality.

Kahneman and Varey (1989)

expanded the purview of adaptation level theory to include
perceptual phenomena.

Unlike sensory adaptation which is

restricted to physical stimuli and biological responses,
perceptual adaptation contemplates perceptual stimuli and
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psychological responses.

Perceptual phenomena are evaluated

psychologically, relative to a norm or frame of reference.
Analogously to sensory adaptation, repeated exposure to a
perceptual phenomenon is postulated to effect a change in
the exposed individual's frame of reference, until the
phenomenon is perceived as the norm (the individual's
revised reference point).

An individual's frame of

reference is the result of the individual's prior experience
and context.

Thus, these aspects serve as the individual's

relevant benchmarks for assessments of variant experiences
and diverse contextual elements.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the process of
adaptation.

Given that the individual's initial reference

point (neutral response state) is located at point A in
Figure 3, successive exposure to a phenomenon at point C
causes a directional shift (leftward) of the individual's
reference point from its initial position at A.

So long as

adaptation to the phenomenon is incomplete, the individual's
reference point is some point B that lies to the right of C,
and the individual perceives the phenomenon as negative, but
of decreasing intensity as the reference point moves closer
to C.

Finally, when adaptation is complete, the revised

reference point coincides with C and the individual's
perception of the phenomenon is neutral.
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Perceptual Adaptation
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The application of perceptual adaptation to tax
compliance suggests that taxpayers experience diminished
responses to recurring tax payments.

Tax return results

would be assessed relative to an historical benchmark (frame
of reference).

Unfavorably perceived outcomes, e.g.,

refunds (payments) less (greater) than those to which the
taxpayer has adapted would be seen as losses.

Favorable

outcomes, e.g., refunds (payments) greater (less) than those
to which the taxpayer has adapted would be seen as gains.
Thus, taxpayers would frame variations from prior results as
gains or losses.
Independent of adaptation level theory, the alleged
inportance of prior return measures in tax compliance is
reflected in the Tax Panel's (National Academy of Sciences
1989) recommendation that sizable changes from prior return
measures be used to signal noncompliance.

The Panel's

intuitive rationale thus concurs with that suggested by the
theory's postulates.

The association between departures

from prior measures and noncompliance, however, is
unvalidated (Long and Swingen 1991).

Using IRS data, Long

and Swingen (1991) performed a cursory examination of the
relationship between the magnitude of the changes from prior
return measures and the incidence of noncompliance.

Results

suggested the reverse, i.e., that larger swings in return
measures were associated with greater compliance.

This
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preliminary finding may be problematic because (1) the
direction of departures may not have been considered (this
is unspecified in the text), and (2) the amounts examined
were extracted from the tax returns as filed.

These return

measures already included the taxpayers' noncompliant
adjustments, and thus were likely to have differed
considerably from the unadjusted return measures that were
unobservable from the data source.
The Present Research
In general, studies to date investigating the validity
of prospect theory's risk predictions in individual tax
compliance have jointly tested the location of the
anecdotally selected zero-refund reference point and the
risk predictions of the theory.

Experimental manipulations

have further, perhaps, failed to cross the salience
thresholds of subjects whose taxpaying levels are variant.
Inconsistent results may be the result of reference point
misspecification, lack of salience of expeimental dollar
amounts, the non-applicability of the theory to tax
reporting decisions, or some combination of these
possibilities.
The present research builds a more comprehensive,
theoretical model of the reference point/frame and the
frame/risk relationships by integrating adaptation level
theory and prospect theory.

The model is used to test
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hypotheses concerning the contextual determinants of framing
and the frame/risk relationship.

Alternative reference

points are considered and all amounts are based on subjectspecific contexts.

Finally, it includes a direct test of

adaptation level theory.

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter discusses theoretical models of taxpayer
frame and taxpayer risk attitude.

The former is derived

from the postulates of adaptation level theory, and the
latter conforms to the risk predictions of prospect theory.
Both adaptation level theory and prospect theory were
discussed in Chapter 2.
developed for each model.

Independent sets of hypotheses are
The integration of the two models

through taxpayer frame, their common component, completes
the link between the hypothesized contextual variables and
the relative levels of risk taxpayers assume in tax
reporting decisions.
After developing the hypotheses, this chapter explains
the experimental methods and procedures.

It outlines the

study participation criteria, presents the rationale for
imposing these criteria, and describes subject recruitment
procedures.

Following, it discusses data collection and

provides the rationale for obtaining these data.

Finally,

it presents the primary statistical methods and models used
to test the four hypotheses under investigation.
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Taxpayer Frame
A Theoretical Model
Adaptation level theory (Kahneman and Varey 1989)
suggests that taxpayers, upon learning the preliminary
results of their current tax returns, evaluate these results
with respect to those they have experienced in prior years
(their reference points). They may compare the preliminary
results to prior results with respect to total tax
liability, refund status, or some other measure(s) or
combination of measures.

If total tax liability is less

than it was previously, the refund due is more, or the
amount of additional tax owed is less, then taxpayers would
be likely to view the preliminary results as favorable and
frame their decisions to file their current returns (as
prepared) as gains.

Conversely, if the comparative results

are in the opposite directions, taxpayers would be likely to
perceive the preliminary returns as unfavorable and frame
decisions to file the returns (as prepared) as losses.
Taxpayer-assessed differences between current tax return
results and prior return results would be the relevant
framing measures.
Because adaptation level theory is silent with respect
to timing, adaptation to prior return results may not
precisely coincide with any given set of priors.

Still,

however, the taxpayer reference point should be some
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function of prior experience.

Material departures, then,

from prior return results should serve as salient framing
determinants despite the potential noise introduced by
incomplete adaptation.

The primary presumption offered by

adaptation level theory is that taxpayer frame is a function
of current departures from prior return m&AsureB.

The first

of the two tiers of the compliance model of the present
study may be represented by the following:

Current Departures from

____________ ^

Prior Return Measures

Taxpayer
Frame

Adaptation level theory further suggests that repeated
or prolonged exposure to the current tax return results
would initiate a shift in the taxpayer reference point.

The

shifting reference point would approach the current return
results.

After some time, differences between the most

recent return measures and the (revised) reference point
would be perceived to be smaller than they were initially,
and the frame induced by the differential would be less
intense than the initial frame.

Taxpayers who perceived the

news of their current results as favorable (unfavorable)
would perceive these same results as less favorable (less
unfavorable) at a later time.

41
Framing Hypotheses
Tax return measures that are likely to be among the
most important to taxpayers are total tax liability and
refund status.

Total tax liability has been suggested by

Schadewald (1989) for taxpayers who have an accrual
orientation and focus on their total tax liability for a
year, regardless of the timing of their tax payments.
Refund status has been suggested as the premier return
measure by all the experimental studies reviewed in Chapter
2, although zero-refund status rather than prior refund
status was defined as the reference point.

Total tax

liability and refund status, taken together, include in
their calculations all taxable income, allowable deductions,
the applicable tax rate, and tax prepayments.

For most

taxpayers these component items probably have the greatest
impact on their overall tax consequences for any one year.
If prior tax liability and prior refund status are used
as possible taxpayer reference points, the theoretical model
of taxpayer frame suggests that current departures from
these prior return measures would be expected to affect
taxpayer frame, i.e., how taxpayers view the consequences of
the current tax return results.

Decreases (increases) in

tax liabilities, increases (decreases) in refunds due, and
decreases (increases) in additional tax payments owed would
be perceived as favorable (unfavorable) changes from prior
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amounts and would result in gain (loss) framing.

Thus, the

first two framing hypotheses may be stated, in their
alternative forms, as follows:
Hla:

Favorable (unfavorable) changes in tax
liabilities from prior tax liabilities
induce gain (loss) taxpayer framing of
the decision to file the current tax
return.

H2a:

Favorable (unfavorable) changes in refund
status amounts from prior refund status
amounts induce gain (loss) taxpayer
framing of the decision to file the
current tax return.

The third framing hypothesis enables a direct test of
adaptation theory in the tax context.

It is based on

adaptation level theory's tenet that the reference point
shifts toward the level of the current stimulus with
prolonged exposure to that stimulus.

This last framing

hypothesis may be stated, in the alternative form, as
follows:
H3a: The intensity of taxpayer frame
diminishes over time.
It is expected that, at a later time, taxpayer frames are
less intense than they were at the time the taxpayers first
became aware of their current tax return results.
Taxpayer Risk Attitude
The Frame/Risk Model
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) predicts
that individuals in loss frames are more risk-prone than
those in gain frames.

This suggests that, in a tax context,
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taxpayer frame affects the level of reporting risk taxpayers
are willing to assume.

Specifically, taxpayers in loss

frames would choose less compliant (riskier) reporting
alternatives than taxpayers in gain frames.

This second

tier of the compliance model of the present study may be
represented by the following:

Taxpayer

Taxpayer

Frame

Risk Attitude

Risk Attitude Hypothesis
Once taxpayers learn their preliminary (compliant) tax
return results, they may file the return as prepared (the
safe alternative). Or, taxpayers may search for amounts
that may possibly, but not with certainty, be construed as
additional deductions or excludable income according to
ambiguously phrased tax law.

If taxpayers detect such

amounts, they then have the option of modifying their
preliminary returns accordingly and filing the resulting,
riskier versions that afford them the chance of receiving
more favorable tax treatment.

Recall, such modifications

are riskier because taxpayer-favorable interpretations of
ambiguous tax law have a probability of IRS disallowance and
sanction imposition.

Thus, taxpayers may often be

confronted with choosing between safe and risky reporting
alternat ives.
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If prospect theory is applicable in a tax context, such
as in the foregoing choice scenario, then taxpayer choices
between the risk-variant alternatives will be affected by
the character of their frames.

The risk attitude hypothesis

of the present study corresponds to the risk predictions of
prospect theory.

It may be stated, in the alternative form,

as follows:
H«.:

Taxpayers in loss frames are more likely
to choose risky reporting alternatives
than taxpayers in gain frames.
The Integrated Model

The two tiers of the tax compliance model thus far
developed in this chapter may be integrated through their
common frame component.

The integrated model may be

represented by the following:

Current Departures from ____ ^
Prior Return Measures

Taxpayer ____ ^
Frame

Taxpayer
Risk Attitude

If independent tests of the two tiers of the integrated
model provide evidence supporting both sets of hypotheses,
then the linkage between observable tax return measures and
taxpayer risk attitude is supported.

Observable changes in

tax return measures may be able to be used to identify
potentially noncompliant taxpayers, thus bypassing the
unobservable psychological nexus (taxpayer frame).

The
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present study is the first to attempt to establish this
psychological link between changes in return measures and
noncompliance.
Subject Recruitment
Taxpayers were recruited through classes held during
the 1995 Summer session at the University of New Orleans.
Because the second questionnaire's construction was based on
pre-experimental information and a repeated trial was
necessary to test for adaptation over time, the study was
time-sensitive and required three experimental sessions
beyond the recruiting session.

Thus, regularly scheduled

classes, rather than other places where taxpayers convene,
were used to minimize attrition over the study period.

In

order to maintain realism for the subjects and thereby
enhance the quality of the data, subject selection criteria
and recruitment procedures were designed to obtain voluntary
participants who actually had the taxpaying latitude to
choose between alternative reporting decisions.
Participation Criteria
To be eligible to participate in the study prospective
subjects were required to (1) have filed U.S. tax returns
for the 1992, 1993 and 1994 tax years,

(2) have an active

Schedule A, Schedule C, or Schedule E, (3) be willing to
furnish blind copies of pages one and two of their Forms
1040 as filed for the three most recently ended tax years.
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and (4) be willing to complete three short questionnaires at
one-week intervals following the initial recruitment
session.
The "three-year filing" criterion (the first stated
above) was expected to filter out inexperienced taxpayers
who would have had greater difficulty understanding and
relating to the task.

It was necessarily imposed to assure

there would be a sufficiency of prior tax return data upon
which to base taxpayer reference points.

The "active

schedule" criterion (the second stated above) was expected
to assure that participants had actual opportunities to
deduct or not deduct ambiguous items and thus would have
viewed as realistic and salient the decisions presented in
the task.

The two remaining criteria were imposed to

collect the required data.
Recruitment Procedure
Sixty-four subjects were recruited from evening
classes, graduate or professional programs, and non-credit
Saturday classes.

These prospective subject pools were

deemed to be comprised of older, more experienced, employed
taxpayers who would be more likely to meet participation
criteria than typical undergraduate students.

Recruiting

generally consumed about five minutes of class time.
Instructor permission to recruit during class had been
obtained in advance.

Prospective subjects were told that
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upon completion of the experiment, they would receive $10
and a complimentary tax consultation if they so desired.
Volunteers selected a five-character identification code
that was subsequently used to identify their respective
data.

The remaining three sessions were held before or

after scheduled class meetings at one-week intervals and
lasted five to ten minutes each.
Data Collection
Data were collected over the three-week period
following the recruiting session.
administered at one-week intervals.

Three questionnaires were
Data may be classified

as pre-experimental, experimental, and post-experimental.
Pre-experimental data was comprised of the participants' tax
returns for the three prior tax years and their responses to
the first questionnaire that obtained their anticipated 1995
changes in taxable income (with respect to 1994),

The first

session following the recruiting session was used to collect
these data and to obtain expectations of 1995 tax liability
and refund status from the holdout sample.

Experimental

data is comprised of subjects' reactions (their frames) to
hypothetical 1995 estimates presented to them and their
inclinations (their risk propensities) to include ambiguous
deductions that would "improve" the estimates presented.
The session following pre-experimental data collection was
used to present to participants their 1995 "estimates" for
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the first time and obtain initial measures of frame and risk
attitude.

The last session was a repeated trial and was

also used to obtain additional subject information (the
post-experimental data).
Pre-experimental Data
At the second meeting, subjects furnished blind copies
of pages one and two of their Forms 1040 for 1992, 1993, and
1994, identified only by their participant codes.

These six

pages contained the amounts of interest, i.e., tax liability
and refund status, for the three prior tax years.

Entire

pages, rather than only the two measures of interest, were
collected so as not to sensitize the taxpayers to the
pertinent amounts.

Only Form 1040 was collected because

requiring all schedules would have been likely to discourage
participation.

The required pages also indicated which

schedules had been included with the full returns so that
subject-specific scenarios concerning hypothetical,
ambiguous deductions could be presented to each participant
at the following session.
At that same meeting, all subjects completed the first
questionnaire that is presented as the first two pages of
Appendix A.

This first questionnaire described the

experimental context as a study of taxpayer reactions to
proposed tax legislation.

Since numerous law changes were

currently pending in Congress and receiving considerable
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attention by the news media, participants would be likely to
believe that the hypothetical tax return estimates presented
to them at subsequent meetings reflected their 1995 tax
consequences under selected, proposed provisions.

The

information requested by the questionnaire was actually
collected in order to determine the influence, if any, that
anticipated changes in taxable income exert on taxpayers'
reference points.

Participants, however, were told that

their 1995 expectations were being obtained to improve the
accuracy of the ensuing estimates.
Twenty subjects, randomly chosen from across a variety
participating classes, also completed the third page of
Appendix A at the second meeting.

These additional data

were the 1995 expected tax liabilities and refund status
amounts of this subsample of participants.

These

expectations were used to derive the final pre-experimental
data, the experimental reference points for the framing
manipulations.
Experimental reference points were modelled
independently for tax liability and refund status.

The

following procedures were performed using 19 of the 20
observations; one extreme outlier was deleted for each of
the two models under construction.

First, the 1995

expectations obtained for the holdout sample (Appendix A,
page 2) were regressed (stepwise) on the prior three years'
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corresponding return measures and on the 1995 estimated
changes gleaned from page one of Appendix A.

The 1995

estimated change in tax liability used in modelling the
liability reference point was calculated as the product of
the net estimated change in taxable income {from Appendix A,
page 1) times

the subject's marginal tax rate (obtained by

inspection of

the 1994 tax return).

The 1995 estimated

change in refund status used to model the refund status
reference point was assumed to equal the 1995 estimated
change in tax liability attributable to anticipated income
changes that would not be subject to source withholding
(evident from

Appendix A, page 1).

Both regression results

showed a high

level of significance

(p - .0001) for the 1994

tax return measure.

The 1995 estimated changes were

marginally significant (p = .0581) and also included
(besides the highly significant 1994 actuals) in the
resulting stepwise model of refund status only.

No other

independent variables reached significance at p * .15 in
either model.
Next, the 1993 tax return measures were regressed by
Ordinary Least Squares on the 1994 measures to isolate any
unique information contained in the 1993 measures that was
not captured by the 1994 measures.

The residual (the unique

1993 information) failed to reach significance at the .10
level in either model.

Nevertheless, residuals were not
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omitted from the final models because episodes (tax return
filings) prior to the most recent (the 1994 filing) had been
found to influence reference points (Varey and Kahneman
1992) .
Finally, both sets of expectations were regressed using
Ordinary Least Squares on the corresponding 1994 measures
that had been highly significant, the corresponding 1995
estimated changes in return measures that had been
marginally significant (although only for refund status),
and the 1993 residuals that are theoretically significant.
Again, only the 1994 measures were significant (p = .0001)
in both regressions.

Thus, for experimental manipulation

purposes, subject reference points for tax liability and
refund status were predicted using the intercepts and the
coefficients of the 1994 measures that resulted from this
third and final set of regressions.

The remaining factors

were dropped from the prediction equation.

The models used

to estimate each participant's experimental reference points
(their 1995 expectations based on prior amounts) were as
follows:
Tax liability reference point ■ 455.761114 + 1.055136L,
where L is the subject's 1994 total tax liability.
Refund status reference point * 56.591744 + .855420R,
where R is the subject's 1994 refund (additionally owed)
amount.
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Framing Data - Trial One
The first measure of taxpayer frame was obtained at the
third meeting by the first item of the questionnaire that is
presented as Appendix B.

Since this questionnaire also

collected the first measure of taxpayer risk attitude, the
order of the questions were reversed to position the framing
inquiry after the risk questions for about one-half the
subjects.

By so doing, it would be verifiable that there

was no order effect influencing either subject-reported
measure.

Participants were required to assess, on a scale

of one to seven, their (dis)satisfaction with hypothetical
1995 estimates of tax liability and refund status that were
presented to them on the previous page (page one of Appendix
B) .

Ratings below four (neutral reaction) represented loss

frames, and ratings above four represented gain frames.
numerical rating was the measure of frame intensity.

The

The

procedures that were used to determine the hypothetical 1995
estimates presented to participants on the first page of the
questionnaire are described in the following paragraphs.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four
treatment groups.

The four groups were designated as "gain-

gain, ■' "loss-loss, " "gain-loss” and "loss-gain, " according
to the frames that were expected to result from the
respective liability and refund status estimates presented
to the group members.

The presentation to a subject of a

53
tax liability that was greater (less) than that subject's
experimental reference point was expected to induce a loss
(gain) frame.

Estimated refund amounts (additional tax

owed) that were less (greater) than the subjects' respective
reference points were expected to induce loss frames;
estimates differing from refund status reference points in
the opposite directions were expected to induce gain frames.
Thus, subjects in the "gain-gain" group were expected to
report gain frames and those in the "loss-loss” group, loss
frames.

For the two groups with crossed manipulations,

i.e., the "gain-loss" and "loss-gain” groups, induced frames
were not predictable.

These groups were included to obtain

insight into the relative contributions to framing afforded
by changes in the two measures.

Table 3.1 summarizes the

treatments applied to the four groups.

It includes the

rules according to which the hypothetical estimates of 1995
tax liabilities and refund status amounts were calculated.
Hypothetical tax liability estimates were expected to
induce gain (loss) frames when they were 30 percent less
(greater) than the subjects' tax liability reference points.
The selection of this percentage was somewhat arbitrary and
based on anecdotal evidence adjusted for a margin of
tolerance.

Given that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981

decreased the top marginal tax rate by 20 percentage points,
and that this piece of legislation is still credited with

54
Table 3.1
Group Treatments

Tax Liability

Refund Status

Manipulated

Manipulated

group

to Induce__

to Induce__

1

gain

gain

2

loss

loss

3

gain

loss

4

loss

gain

Manipulation Rules for Hypothetical Estimates
Liability - gain:

.70 * liability reference point

Liability - loss:

1.30 * liability reference point

Refund Status - gain:

2 * refund status reference point
when refund due;
1/2 * refund status reference point
when additional tax owed

Refund Status - loss:

1/2 * refund status reference point
when refund due;
2 * refund status reference point
when additional tax owed
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effecting the largest tax cut in the history of the income
tax (Smith et a l . 1994), it is reasonable that a 20 percent
change in tax liability is viewed as material by taxpayers.
Because the experimental reference points developed in this
study are not without error, and because some fluctuation in
tax liability is expected across tax years (even without
sizable changes in income or deductions), an additional ten
percentage points were added, thus setting the liability
manipulation at a 30 percent change level.

The use of a 30

percent change in subject-specific liability represents some
degree of refinement over prior studies that used not only
arbitrary, but also constant, amounts across subjects.
If the refund status reference point was a refund due,
a gain frame was expected when the reference point was
doubled, and a loss frame when it was halved.

If the refund

status reference point represented additional tax owed, a
gain frame was expected when the reference point was halved,
and a loss frame when it was doubled.
manipulated by a larger

Refund status was

percentage change than tax

liability because refund status dollar amounts are generally
small compared to total tax liabilities and changes that are
extremely small in absolute dollar amounts would probably
fail to cross taxpayer salience thresholds.
of a factor of two was arbitrary.

The selection

However, a manipulation

56
check that will be discussed in Chapter 4 provides evidence
that the use of this factor was effective.
Risk Attitude Data - Trial One
The first measures of risk attitude were also obtained
at the third meeting by the second and third items on page
two of the second questionnaire (Appendix B).

Subjects were

told that proposed changes in tax law were unclear in
certain areas (e.g., itemized deductions, business
deductions, rental property deductions) and that the wording
could be interpreted to allow additional deductions that had
not been deducted in arriving at the 1995 estimates
presented on the previous page of the questionnaire.

The

specified areas of such ambiguous deductions were those for
which the individual subjects had active schedules.
Subjects were told that the deductions, if taken, would
have a 50 percent chance of disallowance that would trigger
interest and penalties amounting to 50 percent of the
underpaid tax in addition to the underpaid tax.

A

disallowance rate of .5 was used because both White et al.
(1993) and Dusenbury (1994) had found that prospect theory's
frame/risk relationship was most pronounced at the 50
percent detection level.

If the deductions were allowed to

stand, then the taxpayers would reduce their taxes by
specified percentages.

Subjects were required to rate, on a

scale of one to seven, their inclinations to take the
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additional deductions under tax reduction outcomes of both
five percent (low level) and 20 percent (high level).

These

ratings were subsequently used to test the risk attitude
hypothesis.
Repeated Measures
At the fourth and final meeting repeated measures of
framing and risk attitudes were obtained by the third
questionnaire that is presented as Appendix C.

In order to

make plausible the re-presentation of the identical
estimates that were initially given the subjects at the
previous meeting, the previous questionnaire (Appendix B)
had stated that there was an uncertainty that might affect
the estimates and additional confirmation was needed to firm
up the estimates.

On the previous questionnaire subjects

had also been afforded the opportunity to furnish any
additional information they might have had that could affect
their 1995 tax consequences (page one of Appendix B ) .

Thus,

the presentation of final estimates at the fourth meeting
was expected by the participants and the fact that these
estimates remained unchanged should have been credible.
Subjects were again given their 1995 estimates of tax
liabilities and refund status amounts.

Again they were

required to rate, on a scale of one to seven, their
reactions (frames) and their inclinations to take the
additional deductions (risk attitudes).

Re-presentation of
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the estimates and the rating questions appear on the first
page of the third questionnaire {Appendix C) that was
administered at the final meeting.
Post-experimental Data
Post-experimental data were also obtained at the fourth
meeting by the remainder of the repeated measures
questionnaire (Appendix C). Among these data were
participants expectations of their 1995 tax liabilities and
refund status amounts, whether their tax returns were selfprepared, true/false responses to a series of questions to
assess subject-specific risk propensities, subjects'
attitudes toward taxpaying, their familiarity with tax law,
and demographic information.

The reasons for obtaining the

post-experimental data are explained in the following
paragraphs.
Expectations were obtained to perform a validation
check on reference point modelling.

The first 20 (item

seven, parts a through t) of the true/false questions were
taken with permission from the revised Jackson Personality
Inventory (Jackson 1994).

Specifically, they are the

questions that instrument uses to assess the personality
risk trait (in terms of a population percentile).

Subject-

specific risk propensity was considered a necessary control
variable for testing the risk attitude hypothesis because
Kim (1992) found that inter-subject risk differences, in
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addition to frame, significantly influenced subjects'
budgeting choices under conditions of uncertainty.

One of

the remaining items (item eight of Appendix C) corresponded
to the general gamble question used by Kim (1992) to measure
subject-specific risk propensity.

The remainder of the

information was gathered to perform additional tests of
competing hypotheses.
The final page of the questionnaire was included to
remind participants that all dollar amounts discussed in the
experiment were hypothetical and were not reliable amounts
for their 1995 tax returns.

Their signatures, indicating

that they understood the hypothetical nature of the amounts,
were obtained on this sheet to release all parties
associated with the design and conduct of the experiment
from any liability related to the rendering of misleading or
fraudulent tax advice.
Upon completion of the last questionnaire, all subjects
were thanked for participating and were paid the ten dollar
participation fee.

Several subjects asked personal tax

questions that were answered immediately.

Three subjects

requested a private tax consultation at another time and
place.
Tests of Hypotheses
The following subsections present the primary tests of
the framing and risk attitude hypotheses.

The respective
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statistical methods employed were analysis of variance and
regression analysis. The independent and dependent
variables included in the models are described for each of
the tests.
Framing Hypotheses
Analysis of variance was used to test jointly the three
framing hypotheses.

The independent variables were (1)

change in experimental (estimated) tax liability from the
liability reference point,

(2) change in experimental

(estimated) refund status amount from the refund status
reference point, and (3) time.

The dependent variable was

the subject-assessed reaction (frame) to the experimental
estimates presented.

Both change in liability and change in

refund status were between-subjects factors and were
independently characterized as either favorable (when a
lesser liability, a greater refund, or a lesser amount of
additional tax owed had been presented) or unfavorable (when
a greater liability, a lesser refund, or a greater amount of
additional tax owed had been presented), corresponding to
the manipulations that had been applied to the treatment
groups to which the subjects had been assigned.
the repeated measures or within-subjects factor.

Time was
Main

effects were expected to be significant for each of the
three independent factors.
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Risk Attitude Hypothesis
Regression analysis was used to test the frame/risk
hypothesis.

The independent variables were (1) the

subject's reaction {the dependent measure of frame in the
framing tests) and (2) the subject's individual risk
propensity determined from responses to the final
questionnaire.

The dependent variable was the subject-

assessed inclination to take the ambiguous deductions.
Significance was expected for each of the independent
variables.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter describes the analytical procedures
employed in this study and discusses the results obtained.
First, it includes a preliminary inspection and examination
of the data collected to assure that any bias introduced by
procedural aspects of the study did not affect the validity
of the hypothesis tests.

It presents the tests of the

framing and risk attitude hypotheses as well as tests of
competing hypotheses.

Finally, it includes an analysis

directly relating the framing components to risk attitude,
bypassing the frame linkage between the two.
Preliminary Inspection and Examination of Data
The 64 subjects who participated in the experiment were
diverse with respect to a number of characteristics.

These

include age, income level, and occupational area, to name a
few.

Subject demographics are summarized in Table 4.1.

From this summary it appears that the participants were not
"average” taxpayers.

Their relatively high educational

level was the result of recruitment through university
enrollment.

Their higher-than-average income level probably

resulted, at least in part, from the participation criterion
requiring a Form 1040, Schedule A, C, or E.

The atypical

characteristics of the sample, however, suggest that these
individuals were drawn from the real population of interest,
62
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Table 4.1
Subject Demographics

Characteristic

Percent of Sample

Age (Years)
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and Over

7.8
42.1
21. 9
18.8
9.4

Gender
Male
Female

40 .6
59.4

Educational Level
High School
Baccalaureate
Masters
Doctorate

34 .4
29.7
28 .1
7.8

Adjusted Gross Income (1994)
Under $25,000
$25,000 but less than $50,000
$50,000 but less than $100,000
$100,000 and Over

23 .5
35 .9
32 .8
7.8

Occupational Area
Educational
Accounting/Financial
Medical
Entreprenneurial
Sales
Scientific/Technical
Homemaking
Other Areas
None (Student Only)

20,2

17.2
14 .1
12 .5
7.8
6 .3
4 .7
7.8
9.4
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that is, those taxpayers who would have the sophistication
and opportunity to make reporting choices involving
ambiguous deductions.
Accuracy of Expectations Modelling
The first manipulation check compared the empirically
derived expectations (reference points) to those furnished
by the subjects in the debriefing process.

This check was

performed to assess the accuracy of the expectations
modelling.

If the models of expectations developed from the

subsample predicted expectations accurately for all
taxpayers in the study, then these empirical expectations
should approximate the subjects' actual expectations of
their 1995 tax liabilities and refund status amounts.

To

assess the similarity of these two sets of expectations, two
regressions were performed.

In the first, subject-reported

liability expectations, LIABEXP, were regressed on their
respective experimental liability benchmarks, LIABENCH.

In

the second, subject-reported refund status expectations,
RSEXP, were regressed on their experimental refund status
benchmarks, RSBENCH.
for each analysis.

Fifty-five observations were included
The remaining nine of the 64

participants either left blank the spaces provided for
furnishing expectations on the third questionnaire, stated
that they had no idea what to expect, or expressed their
responses in non-quantifiable terms such as "somewhat more
than for 1994".

For the 55 respondents to the expectations
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inquiry, the mean liability expectation was $9,324.
mean liability experimental benchmark was $9,680.

The
The

analogous amounts for refund status were $393 and $3 96,
respectively.
The results of the regression analyses of liability and
refund status are presented in Table 4.2.

Both models are

highly significant (p = .0001) and their R3's are .9311 and
.9038, respectively.

Thus, the modelling procedures

employed appeared to derive experimental benchmarks that
were fairly close estimates of the post-experimental subject
expectations for both measures.
Test for Holdout Sample Bias
Since twenty of the 64 subjects were required to state
their 1995 liability and refund status expectations on the
pre-experimental questionnaire, a demand effect may have
altered these subjects' reported reactions to the 1995
estimates presented.

Specifically, requesting expectations

before presenting the task may have caused these subjects to
use their stated expectations as their mental benchmarks,
when otherwise they would have used different amounts or
might have been unclear regarding their own expectations.
The presence of a demand effect would be evidenced by
stronger framing for the holdout group than for the
remaining 44 subjects.

This test, therefore, investigated

for differences in framing between the two groups.

If

differences in framing were found, then the responses of the

ee

Table 4.2
Tests of Accuracy of Expectations Modelling
Panel A:

LIABEXP

Source

R-Square - .9311

EE

E

Model

1

8343948578.4

Error

53

617759983.24

Total

54

8961708561.6

Variable

EE

Parameter Est.

715.859

I

Pr > F
.0001

Pr >_T

INT

1

586.035716

1.038

.3039

LIABENCH

1

.902734

26.756

.0001

Panel B
Source

RSEXP

R-Square - .9038
DF

SS

Model

1

116638787.05

Error

53

12414054.294

Total

54

129052841.35

Variable

EE

Parameter Est.

E

Pr > F

497.972

.0001

X

Pr > T

INT

1

11.914948

.177

.8605

RSBENCH

1

.963033

22.315

.0001
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20 participants in the holdout sample could not be included
with those of the other 44 subjects in performing the
hypothesis tests.

In the absence of a demand effect, all 64

responses could be included, thus increasing the power of
the tests.
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed.
The dependent measures were the subjects' initial and
repeated reactions (frames). The independent class
variables were change in liability (CHGLIAB), change in
refund status (CHGRS), group (GRP = 1 for holdout sample and
GRP =■ 0 otherwise) , and all interactions of these
independent variables.

Significance of any interaction term

containing the GRP variable would have indicated framing
differences between the two groups.

Significance resulted

for the GRP/CHGLIAB interaction, which had a p-value of
.0707.

Since this meant that inclusion of the holdout

sample in further analyses would have had a safety
probability of about only seven percent, responses of these
subjects were omitted from the remainder of the analyses.
Forty-four observations were used in the following
discussion and tests.
Elimination of Possibility of Order Effects
Subjects were requested on the second questionnaire
(Appendix B) to rate their reactions to the hypothetical
estimates and also to rate their inclinations to take
ambiguous deductions.

The order of presentation of these
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two questions was randomly determined for obtaining these
initial measures.

Of the 44 participants remaining in this

analysis, 17 were presented the reaction query before the
inclination query (ORD = 1) and the remaining 27 received
these questions in the reverse order (ORD » 2).

This test

was performed to afford assurance that responses to each
question were unaffected by the order in which they appeared
on the questionnaire.
Two analyses of variance were performed.

The first one

examined the effect of order on framing responses.
reaction (frame) was the dependent variable.

Initial

Independent

variables were CHGLIAB, CHGRS, ORD, and all possible
interaction terms.

Interaction significance involving ORD

would have indicated that the order of the questions
affected the framing responses.

Resulting p-values for the

CHGLIAB and CHGRS interactions with ORD were .8185 and
.1051, respectively.
value of .2442.

The three-way interaction had a p-

Thus, none of these terms reached

significance at the alpha « .10 level.
The second analysis examined the effect of order on the
inclination (risk propensity) responses.

The dependent

variable used was the inclination to deduct at the five
percent tax savings level, the first inclination question
asked.

Independent variables were initial frame reaction,

order, and their interaction.

The interaction term was not

significant (p - .2068), indicating that analysis of
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covariance was appropriate.

In that analysis, ORD was not

significant (p ■ .2915), thus assuring that the order of the
questions did not affect responses to the risk question.
Summary of Initial Framing Results
Subjects in the gain-gain treatment group were expected
to report initial gain frames {reaction ratings greater than
four on the seven-point scale) when presented with lower tax
liabilities and higher refund amounts or lower additional
tax owed than the subjects' experimental reference points.
Those in the loss-loss group were presented hypothetical
liability and refund status amounts that represented
unfavorable departures from the experimental reference
points, and accordingly, were expected to report initial
loss frames (reaction ratings less than four).

Reported

frames could not be anticipated for the two groups receiving
crossed treatments, i.e., the gain-loss and loss-gain
groups.

Of the 44 subjects under consideration, 12 received

the gain-gain treatment, 10 the loss-loss treatment, 11 the
gain-loss treatment, and 11 the loss-gain treatment.
Table 4.3 summarizes the initial reactions of
participants by treatment group.

Of the 12 subjects in the

gain-gain group, 10 reported gain reactions, one reported
a loss reaction, and one reported a neutral reaction (rating
of four on the seven-point scale).
gain-gain group was 5.25.

The mean rating for the

A t-test that the gain-gain mean

of 5.25 exceeded four resulted in a p-value of .01 and
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Table 4.3
Summary of Initial Reactions (Frames)
by Treatment Group

Number of
Subjects

Treatment
&X2UC__

Mean
Frame
Rating

GG

12

5.25

LL

10

2 .50

GL

11

4 ,72

LG

11

5.18

Treatment
Group__

Number
Reporting
Gain Frames

Number
Reporting
Loss Frames

Number
Reporting
Neutral Frames

GG

10

1

1

LL

2

8

0

GL

4

4

3

LG

7

2

2

G * gain
L = loss
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confirmed that the hypothetical return results presented
successfully induced the intended perception of gain.

The

two subjects not experiencing gain reactions were in
negative cash positions, that is, owed additional tax.

It

is possible that these subjects had the cash mentality
described by Shadewald (1989) and that their negative cash
position overrode the favorable changes in return measures.
Eight of the 10 subjects in the loss-loss group reported
loss reactions, two reported gain reactions, and none of
them reported neutral reactions.

Again, the majority of

subjects confronted with amounts intended to be perceived as
unfavorable changes actually reported loss reactions.

The

two deviating in their perceptions were in positive cash
positions, that is, were receiving refunds.

Again,

Schadewald's (1989) mental orientation explanation could
account for why these subjects viewed the estimates as
favorable even though these estimates represented
unfavorable changes from prior return results.
had a mean response of 2.50.

The group

A t-test that the group mean

of 2.50 was less than four resulted in a p-value of .01,
thus indicating that these participants overall perceived a
loss.
Four subjects in the gain-loss group reported gain
reactions, four reported loss reactions, and three reported
neutral reactions.
4.72.

The mean response for this group was

The loss-gain group responses favored gain reactions,
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with 7 of the 11 subjects reporting gains.

Two subjects

reported loss reactions and two reported neutral reactions.
This fourth group mean rating was 5.18.

The prevalence of

gain perceptions for this crossed treatment group suggests
the dominance of the favorably manipulated refund status
measure over the unfavorably manipulated liability measure.
Summarv_of Initial Frame/Risk Results
Subjects reporting loss reactions were expected to
report higher inclinations to take ambiguous deductions than
those reporting gain reactions.

Table 4.4, Panel A,

summarizes mean inclination ratings corresponding to initial
loss, gain, and neutral reactions (frames) for both levels
of tax savings.

A t-test comparing the mean initial risk

for gain frames to that of loss frames, i.e., 5.33 to 4.52,
at the 5 percent tax savings level, resulted in a p-value of
approximately .08.

Taxpayers in loss frames were more

inclined than taxpayers in gain frames to include the risky
deductions at the 5 percent level of tax savings.

Although

the difference in means at the 20 percent tax savings was in
the expected direction, no significant difference resulted.
When the mean inclinations for both loss and gain frames
were adjusted for the risk propensities corresponding to
neutral framing, i.e., 3.50 and 3.67, prospect theory's
predicted asymetry over the two domains became readily
apparent and the risk propensity (Panel B) corresponding to
losses exceeded that of gains.
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Table 4.4
Initial Frame/Risk Results
Panel A:
Mean Inclination to Deduct
Character
a£. Frame

at 5%
Tax Savings

at 20%
Tax Savinas

Loss

5.33

6.13

Gain

4.52

6.00

Neutral

3.50

3.67

Panel B:
Neutral-Adjusted Inclination
Character
of Frame

at 5%

at 20%

Tax Savings

Tax Savinas

Loss

1.83

2 .46

Gain

1.02

2.33

74
Teats of Framing Bypothssea
This section presents the tests used to explore the
hypothesized determinants of frame and the applicability of
adaptation level theory to framing.

Recall that the first

two framing hypotheses concern the effects on taxpayer frame
of (1) changes in tax liability and (2} changes in refund
status.

Specifically, increased tax liabilities were

expected to induce loss frames while decreased liabilities
were expected to induce gain frames.

Decreased refunds or

increased additional taxes owed were expected to induce loss
frames; changes in the opposite directions were expected to
induce gain frames.

The third framing hypothesis is that

frame intensity diminishes over time because adaptation is
taking place.

It was expected that repeated measures of

taxpayers' frames would converge toward neutrality.
Tests of the framing hypotheses include the primary
tests that employ only the hypothesized framing variables,
i.e., change in tax liability, change in refund status, and
time.

Interactive effects of these variables are considered

in the primary tests.

Tests of competing framing hypotheses

additionally examine the effect on framing of cash position
{refund v. additional tax owed) that has been presumed to
dominate framing in the predecessor studies reviewed in
Chapter 2.

Two potential framing factors, whether the

taxpayer views taxes as pure losses and whether the taxpayer
prefers a refund, are also examined.
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Primary Framing Tests
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed
to test simultaneously all three framing hypotheses.
Dependent variables were the initial reaction (FRAMED and
the repeated reaction measure (FRAME2).

Independent class

variables were change in liability (CHGLIAB) and change in
refund status (CHGRS). They were coded +1 and -1 for
favorable and unfavorable changes, respectively.

It was

expected that both variables would be statistically
significant, thereby supporting the first two hypotheses.
The CHGLIAB/CHGRS interaction was included in the model.
The use of the two reaction measures as dependent variables
captured the effect of time, the third independent
classification variable.

All possible interactions of these

three classification variables were included in the model.
The interaction of time (TIME) with the independent measures
(CHGLIAB and/or CHGRS) was expected to be significant, thus
indicating a change in frame intensity over time.
Table 4.5 presents the results of the overall tests
for between- and within-subjects effects.
means are presented in Table 4.6, Panel A.

Estimated cell
The higher their

values, the more favorably the subjects perceived the
estimates.
point scale.

Individual choices had been made on a sevenThe results show that change in liability,

change in refund status, and their interaction are
significant.

The estimated main effects of Table 4.6, Panel
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Table 4.5
Overall Tests of Primary Framing Hypotheses

Panel A:

Between-subjects Effects

Source

EE

Tvoe III SS

CHGLIAB

1

20.4403998

4 .38

.0430

CHGRS

1

69.7350057

14 .93

.0004

CHGLIAB/CHGRS

1

15.9138061

3.41

.0724

40

186.8636364

ERROR

Panel B:

E

pr > r

Within-subjects Effects

Source

EE

TVDe III SS

E

Pr > F

TIME

1

.04526594

,09

.7624

TIME/CHGLIAB

1

.18106375

.37

.5461

TIME/CHGRS

1

.04526594

.37

.5461

1

.04526594

.09

.7624

40

19.54545455

TIME/CHGLIAB
/CHGRS
ERROR

Note:

P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB and
CHGRS are .0215 and .0002, respectively.
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Table 4.6
Estimates for Primary Framing Tests

Panel A:

Estimated Cell Means
TIME 1

TIME 2

GG 5.25

LG 5.18

GG 5.25

LG 5.09

GL 4.18

LL 2.50

GL 4.45

LL 2.50

Panel B:

Estimated Main Effects

+1 CHGLIAB 4.78

1 CHGLIAB 3.82

+1 CHGRS 5.19

1 CHGRS 3.41

TIME 1

Panel C:

4.28

TIME 2

4.32

Averages of Estimated Cell Means over Time
for (CHGLIAB, CHGRS)
(+1,

+1) 5.25

(+1,

-1) 4.32

(-1,

+1) 5.14

(-1,

-1) 2.50
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B, support the directionality of the hypotheses concerning
the main effects of CHGLIAB and CHGRS.

Thus, there is

initial support for the first two hypotheses.

The main

effect of time and the interactions of time with the other
factors do not reach significance.
(third) hypothesis is not supported.

Thus, the adaptation
Since the experimental

design was primarily directed at examining the determinants
of frame, it is possible that it was not sufficiently
sensitive to detect adaptation, even if it were occurring.
The significance of the interaction of CHGLIAB with
CHGRS suggests that these factors are not simply additive,
but that in combination they affect framing.

Table 4.6,

Panel C, presents the averages of the estimated cell means
over time.

From these averages, the presence of the

interaction is apparent.

Frame ratings across favorable

changes in liability (or refund status) do not parallel
those across unfavorable changes in liability (or refund
status).

For example, the difference between the two levels

Of CHGLIAB for CHGRS - -1 (1.82 - 4.32 - 2.50) is more than
sixteen times greater than that for CHGRS = +1 (.11 = 5.25
- 5.14) .
To interpret the interaction, four additional repeated
measures analyses of variance were performed, one for each
change in liability classification (favorable or
unfavorable) and one for each change in refund status
classification (favorable or unfavorable). Dependent
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variables were the same as for the primary framing tests but
the interaction term was omitted from the independent
variables.

This term was no longer necessary because, in

each analysis, one of the independent variables assumed only
one classification level, rather than two as in the primary
tests.

Only those observations containing the level of

interest for the restricted variable were included in each
analysis.
The separate analyses of the effects of CHGRS on
framing for unfavorable and for favorable CHGLIAB were
qualitatively the same.

In both cases, CHGRS was

significant, having p-values of .0005 and .0306,
respectively.

Analogously, when CHGRS was unfavorable,

CHGLIAB was significant (p » .0028).

However, when CHGRS

was favorable, CHGLIAB did not affect frame (p - .4320).
This suggests that taxpayers factor both variables into
framing except when their change in refund status is
favorable, in which case, the favorable change in refund
status subsumes even unfavorable liability changes.

The

dominance of a favorable change in refund status suggests
that "additional" cash to be received (when a larger refund
is due) or "saved" (if additional tax owed is less) in the
present is far more salient than prepayments of any amount
that may have contributed toward satisfying the tax
liability.

This interpretation concurs with the reasoning
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advanced in prior research (e.g., Westat 1980 and Thaler
1985).
Tests of Competing Framing Hypotheses
The first competing hypothesis tested was the effect of
cash position on framing.

Recall, prior research almost

unanimously used the break-even refund position as the
presumed taxpayer reference point.

Taxpayers were expected

to frame refunds as gains and additional taxes owed as
losses.

Cash position, CASHPOS, was added to the primary

framing model.

CASHPOS was assigned a value of 1 when the

taxpayer was in a refund position and a value of -1 when
additional tax was owed.

A comparison of the values of

CASHPOS with those of both CHGLIAB and CHGRS suggests that
CASHPOS is uncorrelated with either of these other two
variables.

The values of CASHPOS differ from those of

CHGLIAB for 25 of the 44 observations and differ from those
of CHGRS for 21 of the 44 observations.

Of the 44

observations, 28 have CASHPOS - 1 and 16 have CASHPOS = -1.
The between-subjects results of including the CASHPOS
variable are presented in Table 4.7.

Within-subjects

effects of TIME and its interactions did not reach
significance at the alpha = .10 level.

The overall test for

between-subjects effects shows that CHGLIAB, CHGRS, CASHPOS,
and the CHGRS/CASHPOS interaction are significant.

Further

analysis of the CHGRS/CASHPOS interaction, performed
analogously to the analysis of the CHGLIAB/CHGRS interaction
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Table 4.7
Overall Tests of Competing Framing Hypotheses
Including CASHPOS in Model

Between-subjects Effects
Source
CHGLIAB

1

39,3040338

12 .70

.0012

CHGRS

1

34.0219825

10 .99

.0032

CHGLIAB/CHGRS

1

.9789961

.32

.5774

CASHPOS

1

67.1961907

21.71

.0001

CHGLIAB/CASHPOS 1

1. 2467186

.40

.5297

1

10 .5770353

3 .42

.0728

1

6.2610474

2 .02

.1636

36

111.4503968

CHGRS/CASHPOS

a

Z

A

Tvoe III SS

U
a

E£

CHGLIAB/CHGRS
/CASHPOS
ERROR

Note:

P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB,
CHGRS, and CASHPOS are .0006, .0016, and .0001/2,
respect ively.
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in the primary framing test, shows that CHGLIAB and CASHPOS
are highly significant.

CHGRS is significant except when

CASHPOS is negative.
It appears that CASHPOS does not compete with CHGLIAB
and overrides CHGRS only when additional tax is owed.
Overall, CASHPOS complements the hypothesized framing
components.

Together, these three factors explain over 50

percent of the variability in frame or about 20 percent more
than was explained by the two hypothesized variables alone
(not shown on tables). The importance of all three factors
in framing suggests that taxpayers have dual perspectives
(cash and accrual as explained by Schadewald 1989) regarding
income taxes, and that cash position appears dominant.

The

explanation previously offered as to why two taxpayers in
each of the gain-gain and loss-loss treatment groups failed
to perceive the estimates as anticipated, i.e., that cash
position was controlling, is supported by these results.
The analysis including CASHPOS provides additional support
for the first two framing hypotheses but still does not
furnish evidence supporting the third, given that time does
not interact with any of the independent variables in the
model.
Further tests of competing hypotheses included in the
progressive framing model whether taxpayers view taxes as
pure losses (VIEW) and whether taxpayers prefer a refund
(PREFREF).

These factors had been investigated by Dusenbury
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(1994) and neither had been found significant.

Of the 44

taxpayers, 23 viewed taxes as pure losses and 35 indicated
that they preferred a refund.

Evidently, 23 {about one-

half) of the subjects were dissatisfied with the services
they receive for their tax dollars since they viewed taxes
as pure losses.

The majority, as might have been expected,

preferred a refund.

However, nine subjects did not indicate

such a preference, and accordingly, might represent the more
sophisticated taxpayers who prefer to defer the payment of
taxes as long as possible to realize the time value of these
dollars.

As in Dusenbury (1994), no significance resulted

for either VIEW or PREFREF.
Tests of Risk Attitude Hypothesis
Risk propensity is hypothesized to be greater for
taxpayers in loss frames than for those in gain frames.

The

primary tests of thib hypothesis are regression analyses
that also include subject-specific risk measures, Jackson's
(1994) and Kim's (1992), for which data were obtained on the
third questionnaire.

The former is an assessment of

"physical, monetary, social, and ethical risk taking," with
monetary risk taking weighed somewhat more heavily than the
others (Jackson 1994).

Responses to the 20 questions from

the Jackson instrument (posed on the third questionnaire)
were scored for each subject according to the instructions
accompanying the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson
1994) and equated to a population percentile.

Percentiles
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were then converted to a seven-point scale for consistency
with the other metrics in this study.

The Kim risk measure

reflects the subject's propensity to enter a monetary
gamble.

This measure was reported by subjects as a single

response on a seven-point scale.

Both the Jackson and the

Kim risk measures were considered here because each of them
has been found to affect individual choices under
uncertainty.

Kim (1992) used the monetary gamble and found

that this specific risk measure, besides frame, influenced
the riskiness of the choices the subjects made.

Collins,

Milliron and Toy (1992) found social and ethical risk
propensities significant in tax evasion decisions.

Although

that study did not use the Jackson measure, the Jackson
index includes the social and ethical dimensions of risk in
addition to the monetary assessment of Kim's measure.
Further tests include a number of factors that have at
times been found to affect risk attitude and that, for the
most part, were briefly discussed in Chapter 1.

These

include taxpayer age, gender, educational level, adjusted
gross income, familiarity with tax law that specifically
affects the taxpayer's own return, familiarity with tax law
overall, perception of peer compliance, fear of audit, fear
of sanctions, whether the taxpayer self-prepares the return,
and whether the taxpayer searches for all possible
deductions.

85
Primary Risk Attitude Tests
Two primary regression analyses were performed
examining the effect of subject reactions to the
hypothetical tax return estimates (frames) on subjects'
inclinations to include ambiguous deductions on their
returns (risk attitudes). The first analysis includes
measures from the first trial and the second, the repeated
measures.

Within each trial, two measures of inclination

had been collected, one for each of two levels of tax
savings.

For each analysis, observations having neutral

frames (reaction ratings of 4) were omitted since neutral
frames are not contemplated by the hypothesis under
investigation and their inclusion might have introduced
noise and occluded the relationship of interest.

This

resulted in the inclusion of 38 observations for each
analysis, although the same 38 were not used in both
regressions since subject ratings of their reactions did not
and had not been expected to remain constant across trials.
Since the Jackson and Kim subject-specific risk measures
were correlated (Pearson coefficient of .41523 and p-value
of .0006), both regressions were performed including
separately the two risk measures, making a total of four
primary regressions.
The first regression analysis examined the effects of
frame (FRAMED, the Jackson risk assessment (JSPRISK), and
their interactions (FRAME1/JSPRISK) on subjects' initial
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inclinations (risk attitudes) across levels of tax savings.
Between- and within-subjects effects are presented in Table
4.8.

FRAME1 and the FRAME1/JSPRISK interaction are

significant.

Further analysis of the interaction showed

that frame was significant when taxpayers' individual risk
propensities were averse, that is, when the Jackson index
was less than neutral, but had no effect for individually
risk-prone subjects with above-neutral Jackson indexes.
When FRAME1 was significant, the sign of the FRAME1
coefficient was negative, indicating that the lower the
reaction rating (the more unfavorable the frame), the higher
the inclination to assume risk and take the ambiguous
deductions.

This concurs with the risk predictions of

prospect theory and supports the frame/risk hypothesis.

The

within-subjects effects of SAVINGS/JSPRISK and
SAVINGS/FRAME1/JSPRISK are also significant.

Examining the

directionality of the data discloses a direct relationship
between level of tax savings and risk propensity.
Similarly, the second regression examined the effects
of the repeated reaction measure (FRAME2), JSPRISK, and
FRAME2/JSPRISK on the subjects' repeated inclinations (risk
attitudes) across levels of tax savings.

In this analysis,

no between- nor within-subjects effects reached significance
at the alpha * .10 level.
The third and fourth regressions were repeats of the
first two, but substituted the Kim risk measure for the

Table 4.6
Overall Tests of Primary Risk Attitude Hypotheses
for Initial Measures

Panel A;

Between-subjects Effects

Source

DF

XXBC 111 SS.

FRAME1

1

20.84353764

5 .33

.0272

JSPRISK

1

7.37590424

1.89

.1786

FRAME1/JSPRISK

1

19.13477569

4 .89

.0338

34

132.96402878

ERROR

Panel B:

£

Pr > F

Within-subjects Effects

Source

DF

Tvoe III SS

SAVINGS

1

4.52257261

9.03

.0050

SAVINGS/FRAME1

1

.61970299

1,24

.2737

SAVINGS/JSPRISK 1

2.93926438

5 .87

.0209

1

2.24991955

4.49

.0414

34

17.02277992

£

Pr > F

SAVINGS/FRAME1
/JSPRISK
ERROR
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Jackson index.

No significance resulted at the alpha = .10

level for any between- or within-subjects effect in either
analysis.
The results of these tests may be summarized as
follows:
(1}

Frame affects risk attitude as predicted by

prospect theory and the frame/risk hypothesis when taxpayers
are inherently risk-averse.

The effect, however, is

temporary; it was detected for the initial trial but not for
the repeated trial.
(2)

Tax compliance decisions entail multiple risk

dimensions, rather than simply the inclination to enter a
monetary gamble. The use of the Jackson index enabled the
detection of the frame/risk relationship but the use of the
Kim metric did not.
(3)

Taxpayers assume greater risk when the potential

tax savings are greater.

This conclusion is derived from

the significance of the within-subjects factors in the first
regression.
Result (1) supports the fourth (frame/risk) hypothesis.
It also suggests that, although frame intensity was not
found to diminish in the framing tests, the effect of frame
intensity on risk attitude did diminish over time.

Result

(2) concurs with Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) that found
that ethical and social risk concerns affected tax
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compliance decisions.

Result (3) agrees with intuition and

is a by-product of the tests performed here.
Tests of Competing Risk Attitude Hypotheses
The 44 observations were included in tests introducing
eleven additional, potential risk attitude factors, most of
which have previously been hypothesized to affect taxpayer
reporting risk and all of which were collected by the third
questionnaire.

These additional variables are the

following:
AGE - Taxpayer's age in years.

Values for the age

variable range from 19 to 65 years and have a mean of 37
years.
GEN = Taxpayer's gender; 1 = male, 0 * female.

This

sample is comprised of 18 males and 26 females.
EDU ■ Taxpayer's highest completed educational level; 1
* high school, 2 - baccalaureate, 3 - advanced degree(s).
There are 12 one's, 14 two's, and 18 three's in the sample.
AGI - Taxpayer's 1994 adjusted gross income.
ranged from zero to $160,419.

AGI's

Participants had a mean

adjusted gross income of $57,156.
SPLAW - Taxpayer's rating of familiarity with specific
tax law provisions that affect him/her.
one to seven on a seven-point scale.
SPLAW is 4.2.

Ratings range from

The mean rating for
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GNLAW «■ Taxpayer's rating of familiarity with general
tax law.

These ratings also range from one to seven and

have a mean of 3.9.
PEER - 1 if taxpayer perceives peers as noncompliant
with tax laws and 0 otherwise. Over 80 percent of
participants believe peers are noncompliant.
AUD * 1 if taxpayer fears a tax audit of his/her return
and 0 otherwise.

About 44 percent of participants reported

this concern.
SANC * 1 if taxpayer fears sanctions and 0 otherwise.
About 30 percent of participants reported this concern.
SELF * 1 if taxpayer prepares own tax return and 0
otherwise.

About 52 percent of participants prepare their

own returns.
ALL « 1 if taxpayer searches for all possible
deductions and 0 otherwise.

Almost 80 percent of

participants reported that they search for all deductions.
Four stepwise regressions were performed, regressing
initial and repeated subject inclinations at both levels of
tax savings on the independent variables used in the primary
models plus the eleven additional variables described above.
The resulting models included up to four factors: KSPRISK,
SPLAW, SANC, and ALL.

The latter three were from among the

additional eleven variables and KSPRISK had been previously
included in the primary tests.
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Testa for competing risk attitude hypotheses used the
primary risk attitude model containing the Jackson index
expanded to include KSPRISK, SPLAW, SANC, and ALL, those
factors identified by the Stepwise procedure.

At alpha =

.10 for a one-tailed t-test, SANC, SPLAW, and ALL are
significant for the initial trial and KSPRISK, SANC, and ALL
are significant for the repeated trial.
significant.

Frame is no longer

The differences resulting from the

introduction of the additional variables are likely
attributable to the duplication of information contained in
both FRAME1 and the additional variables.

Pursuing this

explanation, FRAME1 was regressed on KSPRISK, SANC, SPLAW,
and ALL.

Both SANC and SPLAW were significant, thus

supporting the possibility of information duplication.
Additionally, a Pearson correlation analysis shows FRAME1 to
be correlated with SANC, having a coefficient of .21 and a
p-value of .09.

Thus, frame and taxpayer perceptions of

sanctions appear related and may explain the lack of
significance of FRAME1 in the expanded model when Type III
sums are used.

Recall, Type III sums of squares reflect

only the unique information contained in a variable and in
this case, SANC may subsume FRAME1.
The results of the tests of competing risk attitude
hypotheses show that the taxpayer's propensity to enter a
monetary gamble, perceptions of sanctions, familiarity with
specific tax provisions, and whether the taxpayer searches

92
for all possible deductions influence the risk taxpayers
assume in making reporting choices.

Perceptions of

sanctions and familiarity with specific tax laws appear to
compete with the informational content of taxpayer frame.
These competing variables have been found influential in
prior studies discussed in the first two chapters.
Direct Tests of Framing Component Bffecte
on Risk Attitude
Support has been obtained for the first two framing
hypotheses and the frame/risk relationship, the two tiers of
the theoretical model of tax compliance developed in Chapter
3.

If the relationships within each of the two tiers of the

theoretical model are sufficiently strong, then the framing
components identified in this study should relate directly
to risk attitudes when the framing link is omitted.

Direct

tests of risk attitude versus framing components were
performed to obtain additional assurance that it may be
possible to curtail taxpayer aggressiveness by implementing
policies that minimize "unfavorable11 changes and statuses in
tax return measures.

The three independent variables used

in these tests were CHGLIAB, CHGRS, and CASHPOS, those that
were found to be significant components of taxpayer frame.
For the first analysis, the dependent variables used were
the initial (LRISK1) and repeated (LRISK2) inclinations at
the low (5 percent) tax savings level.

For the second,

inclinations (HRISK1 and HRISK2) at the high (20 percent)
tax savings level were the dependent measures.

Both pairs
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of dependent variables represented TIME across the
experimental trials for each of the levels of tax savings.
Tests for between- and within-subjects effects for the
first repeated measures analysis of variance (for low tax
savings across trials) are presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.10,
respectively.

CHGLIAB is significant but no other between-

subjects effect reaches significance at the alpha - .10
level.

An interesting observation emerges from the within-

subjects tests.

Despite the non-significance of TIME in the

framing tests, here TIME interacted with CHGRS and with
higher order interactions.

This result concurs with the

decreased effect of frame found over time in the frame/risk
tests and again suggests that although frame intensity does
not abate, its effects do.

For the repeated measure of risk

propensity at the low tax savings level, no factors reached
significance at the alpha = .10 level.

Similar analyses for

the high (20 percent) tax savings level resulted in no
significant effects at the alpha - .10 level.
These direct tests provide evidence that CHGLIAB and
TIME do affect risk propensities, at least at low (5
percent) levels of tax savings.

Since discretionary

reporting options are likely to involve low levels of tax
savings more often than higher tax savings, the results of
this direct test appear relevant.

The significance of TIME

may be indirect evidence that adaptation was occurring but
that it was not detected in testing the third framing
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Table 4.9
Overall Direct Tests of Framing Component Effects
at the 5 Percent Tax Savings Level

Between-subjects Effects
A

CHGLIAB

1

11.8975077

2 .14

.1522

CHGRS

1

.2172664

.04

.8444

CHGLIAB/CHGRS

1

.0347626

.01

.9374

CASHPOS

1

7.1720175

1.29

.2636

CHGLIAB/CASHPOS 1

.2172664

.04

.8444

1

.6757883

.12

.7294

1

3.8658335

,70

.4098

36

200.1349206

CHGRS/CASHPOS

Ih

U

Z

&

DF

sour??

CHGLIAB/CHGRS
/CASHPOS
ERROR

Note:

P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB,
CHGRS, and CASHPOS are .0761, .4222, and .1318,
respectively.
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Table 4.10
Overall Direct Tests of Framing Component Effects
at the 5 Percent Tax Savings Level

Within-subjects Effects

EE

Source

Type III SS

E

Pr > F

TIME

1

7.01402356

7 .58

.0092

TIME/CHGLIAB

1

.20557710

.22

.6402

TIME/CHGRS

1

3.52382748

3 .81

.0588

/CHGRS

1

.30814121

.33

.5674

TIME/CASHPOS

1

.53740214

.50

.4509

.62789988

.68

.4154

4.91145946

5.31

.0271

1

3 .09245493

3.34

.0758

36

33.30158730

TIME/CHGLIAB

TIME/CHGLIAB
/CASHPOS
TIME/CHGRS
/CASHPOS
TIME/CHGLIAB
/CHGRS/CASHPOS
ERROR

Note:

The P-value for the uni-directional simple effects
test (that is a one-tailed t-test) is one-half that
of the F-test reported here. Pr > t for TIME is
.0046.

96
hypothesis.

However, whether or not adaptation explains the

temporary nature of the frame/risk relationship, the
presence of this phenomenon may find applicability in tax
enforcement.
Summary
The results presented in this chapter are summarized in
Table 4.11.

Support has been obtained for the first two

framing hypotheses, i.e., that changes in tax liability and
changes in refund status affect taxpayer frame.
effects are in the hypothesized directions.

These

The risk

attitude hypothesis, that taxpayers in loss frames make
reporting decisions that are more aggressive than those in
gain frames, is also supported.

The adaptation (third)

framing hypothesis is not supported.
Favorable and unfavorable changes in refund status are
significant determinants of gain and loss frames.

Favorable

and unfavorable changes in liability are significant except
when the change in refund status is favorable.

In this

case, a favorable change in refund status overshadows even
an unfavorable liability change.
Although no direct support was obtained to support the
reduction in frame intensity over time, evidence that the
effects of frame intensity diminish over time surfaced along
with support for the frame/risk relationship.

Frame, a

significant determinant of risk attitude for risk-averse
taxpayers for the initial trial, lost its significance in

Table 4.11
Summary of Results

Panel A:

Results of Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis
Hla: Favorable (unfavorable) changes
in tax liabilities from prior tax
liabilities induce gain (loss) tax
payer framing of the decision to file
the current tax return.

Results
Supported except
when change in
refund status is
favorable.

H2,: Favorable (unfavorable) changes
Supported,
in refund status amounts from prior
refund Btatus amounts induce gain (loss)
taxpayer framing of the decision to file
the current return.
H3a: The intensity of taxpayer frame
diminishes over time.

Not supported,

H4a: Taxpayers in loss frames are more Supported for tax
likely to chooBe risky reporting alter- payers who are
natives than taxpayers in gain frames.
risk-averse indi
viduals .

Panel B:

Other Significant Results

Cash position also affects taxpayer frame. Refunds due
induce gain frames and additional taxes owed induce loss
frames.
Although frame intensity does not diminish over time, its
effects on reporting risk do diminish over time.
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the repeated trial. These tests not only furnish support
for the fourth (risk) hypothesis but indicate that even if
adaptation does not explain the waning effect of frame, its
effects on risk attitude dissolve over time.
Cash position appears to complement change in liability
and change in refund status and appears to be the premier
component of framing.

Taxpayers in refund positions are

"happier" with their results than those who owe additional
tax.

This result concurs with the reasoning upon which

prior research was based.
Other variables found to be significant risk attitude
determinants are taxpayers' perceptions of sanctions, their
knowledge of specific tax provisions that affect their
personal returns, and whether they search for all possible
deductions.

Studies briefly discussed in the first chapter

found the first two of these influential and Dusenbury
(1994) had tested the third but did not find that it was
related to risk attitude.

The loss of significance of frame

when these variables are included in the tests suggests that
frame may be capturing much of the information contained in
these three.
A direct analysis of the effects of framing components
on risk attitude showed that change in liability and time
are significant at lower levels of tax savings.
the effects of change in liability disappear.

Over time,
This result
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again suggests that frame loses its effect on risk attitude
after some time has passed.

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Zntroduc tion
This study was motivated by the enormous individual tax
compliance gap that exists despite costly enforcement efforts
targeted at narrowing the gap.

It has sought additional

insight into the origin of noncompliance, in order to suggest
strategies that may reduce noncompliance incentives and
complement the disincentive enforcement mechanism that is
directed toward identifying and punishing taxpayers who have
already made noncompliant decisions.

A perceptual model of

the noncompliance process has been developed and the model's
framing and risk attitude tiers have been examined.
Specifically, the study has investigated the effects of
departures from prior return measures on taxpayer frame, and
in turn, the effects of frame on the level of risk assumed in
choosing between reporting alternatives.
In this chapter, summarized results of the framing and
risk attitude tests are interpreted in the tax context.
Implications for tax policy are discussed.

Several

limitations of the study are presented and implications for
future research are explored.
Interpretation of Results
Results obtained in testing the framing and risk attitude
hypotheses using the data obtained from the taxpayers
participating in this experiment support the hypothesized
100
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framing link between changes from prior tax return measures
and tax reporting risk propensity.

These results suggest that

taxpayers with increased tax liabilities, smaller refunds, or
larger amounts of additional tax owed at filing, compared to
their prior years' amounts, would be more likely to frame
these tax return results as losses and would be more apt to
make riskier (less compliant) modifications to these tax
returns.

The initial strength of the relationships appear to

diminish as time passes, because either frame intensity or its
effect on risk propensity is some decreasing function of time.
Thus, taxpayers who are apprised of their forthcoming return
results well ahead of filing time are likely to have reduced
reporting risk propensities.
Xaplicatlona for Tax Policy
The results of this study may find tax enforcement
application in the area of tax policy.

Tax policy may be able

to be formulated so as to minimize, with respect to frequency
and extent, the occurrence of conditions that induce loss
frames.

To reduce dramatic increases in tax liabilities from

year to year, perhaps income averaging provisions could be
reintroduced.

These might consider income and deductions and

require the averaging of each over three or more years.

Thus,

increases in income and decreases in deductions would be
smoothed and the loss framing potential for taxpayers,
reduced.

Although this approach, compared to current law,

would defer collections of tax from taxpayers with escalating
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liabilities, deferral would compare favorably with non
collection that too often emerges from loss frames.
The negative framing effects of refund status changes may
be minimized through stiffened prepayment requirements.
Subjecting all income to source withholding, without
exemption, may be one approach.

Requiring prepayments equal

to 100 percent of the current year's estimated tax liability
may be another.

Larger prepayments would not only reduce

unfavorable refund status changes and the negative framing
effect at filing time but would also separate in time the
taxpayer's realization of any increase in tax liability
(learned upon prepayment) and the filing of the return (the
time noncompliance decisions are made).

Hence, the effects of

any loss framing induced by increased prepayments should have
at leaBt partially waned by filing time.

Requiring more

frequent taxpayer accountability involving estimation of the
current year's taxable income might also serve to minimize
adverse taxpayer surprises at filing time.

Implementation of

these same prepayment policies may also reduce the number of
taxpayers owing additional tax at filing time.

Thus, the

incidence of negative cash position, a factor found to
complement the hypothesized framing variables in inducing loss
frames, may also be reduced.
Remedial enforcement policy may be targeted at those
taxpayers whose returns meet the conditions that induce loss
frames and also exhibit latitude for taxpayer discretion in
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reporting decisions.

For instance, Form 1040 tax returns with

accompanying Schedule B (itemized deductions), Schedule C
(self-employment), or Schedule E (rents and royalties) would
provide taxpayers the opportunity to include ambiguous
deductions or to overstate actual deductions on these forms.
Auditing the returns of such taxpayers may recover tax
revenues more effectively than the present random audit
process.

This approach concurs with the IRS's soon-to-be-

implemented strategy discussed in Chapter 1.
The major shortfall of using tax return measures as
indexes of loss framing and noncompliance is that filed tax
returns already incorporate the noncompliant modifications
made by taxpayers.

The unmodified, preliminary versions of

the returns would reflect the attributes of interest but these
are not observable by the IRS.

Returns including larger

modifications would be even less compliant than returns
including smaller ones.

Ironically, those returns containing

the largest tax understatements may not appear suspect.

For

instance, tax returns containing taxpayer "adjustments" that
result in a refund due, but without which additional tax would
have been owed, would not appear to be conducive to loss
framing and would be likely to escape scrutiny.

Although

remedial strategies based on the results of this study may
have limited enforcement potential, the primary contribution
of this study lies in the formulation of preventive tax
enforcement strategies such as those discussed above.
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Lini tations
The participation criteria imposed precluded the sample's
representativeness of taxpayers in general.
results may not generalize to all taxpayers.

Hence, the
However, the

subject screening criteria resulted in subjects that possessed
more education, higher income levels, and more complex tax
returns than taxpayers in general.

Participants were more

likely to have the latitude and sophistication to assume risky
filing postures.

The sample, therefore, was representative of

the population of interest - potentially noncompliant
taxpayers.
Subjects were faced with the decision to include an
ambiguous deduction.

This was a tax avoidance decision.

There is no assurance that the results of the study generalize
to decisions to engage in tax evasion.

Evasion may evoke

numerous additional ethical and social concerns that were not
relevant here and that may contravene framing effects.
Requiring subjects to furnish copies of their prior
years' Forms 104 0 may have sensitized them to the measures of
interest.

Even though both pages of this form were collected

to minimize such an effect, responses to the framing questions
may have been based on prior amounts if participants had
reviewed their prior returns immediately before furnishing
them.

However, in actuality the same influence may be present

because taxpayers are likely to refer to prior tax returns in
the course of preparing the current return.
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Expectations collected in the debriefing process may have
been influenced by the estimated amounts presented during the
experiment.

If such an effect were operating, then the tests

for accuracy of expectations modelling may be inconclusive.
Unbiased expectations may have differed from those reported.
Finally, there is the possibility that the experiment
lacked realism for the subjects, despite the precautions taken
to assure it.

Subjects may not have reacted as intensely aB

they would have in actuality and/or their reported
inclinations to include ambiguous deductions may not have
corresponded to what they would have done in actuality.

A

lack of realism, however, would probably have diluted both
reactions and inclinations and, accordingly, introduced an
unfavorable bias.

Despite this possibility, results have

emerged.
Implications for Future Rassarch
Further tax compliance research should be stimulated by
the contributions of this study to the literature base,
specifically, the identification of the framing components
suggested by adaptation level theory.

This study has made

initial progress in explaining what tax return attributes
cause taxpayers to frame their results as gains or losses.
Further research may be able to model taxpayer framing more
precisely.
The framing results may stimulate research in other
disciplines as well.

How individuals in non-tax contexts
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frame choices may also be relative to their prior experiences.
Thus, non-tax research in various disciplines may be
stimulated to examine the applicability of adaptation level
theory to framing.
The results of this study also suggest that the effects
of framing on noncompliance are most pronounced initially and
diminish rapidly.

Thus, timing may also play an important

role in reducing the level of noncompliance.

Future research

might examine the manner in which time dilutes risk
propensity.

It may be that frame intensity does diminish over

time but in this study the frames reported in the repeated
trial were not reflecting the taxpayers' actual reactions at
that time.

Experiments designed with the primary purpose of

investigating the frame-intensity/time curve may be warranted.
If reported frame intensity is unchanged by time, it may be
interesting to attempt to disentangle the intellectual
assessment of frame from the psychological reaction to it.
Regardless why framing effects on risk attitude diminish, the
timing of the decreasing effects invites further research.

If

it were known how long it takes for risk propensities to wane
after taxpayers first learn the direction and size of changes
in their tax return results, then reporting requirements might
be imposed to inform taxpayers of changes soon enough to
permit risk propensity to mellow before the return must be
filed or the final payment made.
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APPENDIX A
Participant XXXXX:
The study in which you have agreed to participate will
explore your reactions to the types of tax law changes
currently being considered by Congress. There are no right
or wrong answers to any of the questions you will be asked.
Simply answer them as best you can.
The next time we meet, I will provide
of your 1995 tax return results given
changes currently under consideration
improve the accuracy of my estimates,
following questionnaire.

you with an estimate
that the tax law
are passed. To
please complete the

Circle either "yes” or "no" in response to the following
questions. For each "yes" answer, please answer the next
question in the blank space provided for this purpose.
If
you file jointly, please consider these questions with
respect to both you and your spouse.
In 1995, do you expect to
1. Add or lose dependents relativeto 1994?
If yes, how many dependents will you
claim for 1995? _____________

Yes

2. Have a change in marital status?
Yes
If yes, to what status? ________________
3.

4.

Begin new employment, end (quit or lose) your
old job, or both
(change jobs)?
Yes
If yes, what approximate 1995 income do
you expect from all (old and/or new)
employment? S__________________
Begin a new business activity or discontinue
an old one?
Yes
If yes, what approximate 1995 net income
do you expect from all self-employment
activities? £_________________

No

No

No

No
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Please describe any other major changes in your tax
circumstances for 1995 that have not been mentioned above.
These may include such things as sales of assets, receipt of
tax deferred distributions, or anything that may cause a
sizable change in your income or deductions. Estimate the
effect of these items on your taxable income.
Dollar Estimate of
Increase (Decrease)
Item
in Taxable Income
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Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995
tax year, what approximate total tax liability do you expect
to have for 1995? £__________________
Definition: Your tax liability is the total income tax
you owe on all your taxable income for the year, not just
the amount you pay when you file your return. Tart of this
liability may be prepaid through payroll withholding or
estimated tax payments you make during the year.
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995
tax year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to
pay when you file your return? £____________________
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995
tax year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to
racaiva as a refund when you file your return? £____________
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APPENDIX B
Participant XXXXX:

I have calculated preliminary estimates of your 1995
taxes based on the tax law changes now before Congress.
There is, however, one aspect that needs additional
confirmation. I will finalize these estimates later. For
now, they reflect the information available to me.
Since our last meeting, have you thought of anything
else that may affect your 1995 taxes? If so, please
specify. _______________________________________________

The following estimates are based on the information
you provided previously:
1, Your total 1995 tax liability will be approximately
$xxxxx.
Remember, your tax liability is the total income
tax you owe on all your taxable income for the year.
You may be prepaying part of this liability through
payroll withholding or by making estimated tax payments
for 1995.
2.

Your total 1995 refund will be approximately $XXXX.
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1.

On the following 7-point rating scale below, please
circle the number that best summarizes your reaction to
the estimates presented on the preceding page. The
scale ranges from one (very dissatisfied, upset, at a
loss) to seven (very well satisfied, lucky, pleased).
1
2
Very
dissatisfied

2.

3

4

5

6

Neutral

7
Very well
satisfied

Based on an analysis of the proposed changes, there
appears to be an opportunity for some tax savings for
some taxpayers. The wording of the proposals can be
interpreted to allow an increase in certain Schedule
(letter and title of either A, C, or E as applicable to
the participant) deductions. The tax savings could be
significant to you if you adopt this interpretation and
take the additional deductions.
There is about a 50 percent chance that the IRS would
interpret the law differently and that the deductions
would be disallowed. If the interpretation is accepted
by the IRS, you would end up reducing your total tax
liability by about 5 percent. If the additional
deductions are disallowed, you could end up paying the
additional tax and interest and penalties amounting to
about 50 percent of the additional tax.
On the 7-point scale below, please circle the number
that rates your inclination to take these deductions.
The scale ranges from one (I definitely would not take
the deductions!) to seven (I'd definitely take the
deductions!).
1
2
Definitely
would not
take deductions

3.

3

4

5

6

Neutral

7
Definitely
would
take deductions

Suppose the additional deductions presented in the
previous question would reduce your taxes by 20 percent
instead of 5 percent. Now rate your inclination to take
the deductions.
1
2
Definitely
would not
take deductions

3

4

Neutral

5

6

7
Definitely
would
take deductions
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APPENDIX C
Participant XXXXX:
1.

Since the last time we met, I have finalized your 1995
preliminary tax estimates and find that, based on the
information you provided, there is no change from what was
reported previously.
Your 1995 total tax liability will be approximately
$xxxx.
Your total 1995 refund will be approximately $XXXX.

2.

On the following 7-point rating scale below, please circle
the number that best summarizes your reaction to the above
estimates at this tiaa. The scale ranges from one (very
dissatisfied, upset, at a loss) to seven (very well
satisfied, lucky, pleased).
1
2
Very
di ■satisfied

3.

3

4

5

6

Neutral

7
Very well
satisfied

The questionable deductions discussed last time are not
reflected in the above estimates. Recall, if you choose
to take these deductions, there is a 50 percent chance
that they will be disallowed by the IRS. If the
deductions are allowed, you would end up reducing your
taxes by about 5 percent.
If the deductions are not
allowed, you could end up paying the additional tax and
interest and penalties amounting to about 50 percent of
the additional tax.
On the 7-point scale below, please circle the number that
rates your inclination to take these deductions. This may
or may not be similar to how you responded last time. The
scale ranges from one (I definitely would not take the
deductions!) to seven (I'd definitely take the
deductions I) .
1
2
Definitely
would not
take deductions

3

4

Neutral

5

6

7
Definitely
would
take deductions
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4.

Suppose the additional deductions presented In the
previous question would reduce your taxes by 20 percent
instead of 5 percent. Now rate your inclination to take
the deductions.
1
2
Definitely
would nob
take deductions

3

4

Neutral

5

6

7
Definitely
would
take deduct ons

Usually (circle one)
(a) you or your spouse prepare your own tax return
(b) you pay a professional tax preparer or
(c) you have someone (friend, relative) prepare it
for you as a favor?
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 tax
year, what approximate total tax liability do you expect
to have for 1995? £__________________
Assuming there are no changes
in tax law for the 1995 tax
year, approximately how much,
if any, do you expect to
owe
and pay when you file your return? £_________ ___________
Assuming there are no changes
in tax law for the 1995 tax
year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to
receive as a refund when you file your return? £________
For each of the following statements, circle "T" if you
agree that the statement is a true description of you. If
you disagree and feel the statement falsely describes you,
then circle "F". Please circle one of the letters for
each statement even if you are somewhat unsure:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

People have told me that I seem to enjoy
taking chances.

T

F

When I want something, I'll sometimes go
out on a limb to get it.

T

F

I consider security an important element
in every aspect of my life.

T

F

I rarely, if ever, take risks when there
is another alternative.

T

F

In games I usually "go for broke" rather
than playing it safe.

T

F

I try to avoid situations that have
uncertain outcomes.

T

F

Taking risks does not bother me if the
gains involved are high.

T

I would prefer a stable position with a
moderate salary to one with a higher
salary but less security.

T

The thought of investing in stocks excites
me .
T
I would participate only in business under
takings that are relatively certain.
T
I would enjoy bluffing my way into an
exclusive club or private party.

T

If the possible reward was very high, I
would not hesitate putting my money into a
new business that could fail.
T
I rarely even make small bets.

T

If I invested any money in stocks, it would
probably only be in safe stocks from large,
well-known companies.
T
I enjoy taking risks. '

T

When in school, I rarely took the chance of
bluffing my way through an assignment.
T
I would enjoy the challenge of a project
that could mean either a promotion or loss
of a job.
T
Skin diving in the ocean would be much too
dangerous for m e .
T
I think I would enjoy almost any type of
gambling.

T

I probably would not take the chance of
borrowing money for a business deal even if
it might be profitable.
T
I think of income taxes as purelosses.

T

I prefer a tax refund to an additional
payment owed at filing time.

T

I worry that my tax return will

beaudited. T
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x. I look for every possible tax deduction.
y.

T

F

I'd rather overpay than underpay my taxes
because I worry what the IRS would do to me
if they thought I was cheating.
T

F

z. I think people often cheat on their taxes
and get away with it.
8.

T

F

Suppose you have a choice between playing a game in which
you have a 50 percent chance of winning $10 and a 50
percent chance of losing $10 or not playing the game.
On the following scale that ranges from one (extremely
unwilling to play) to seven (extremely willing to play),
circle the number that best describes your willingness to
play the game,
1
Extremely
unwilling
to play

9.

2

3

4

5

6

Neutral

7
Extremely
willing
to play

Please provide the following information:
Age?
Gender? __________ (M or F)
Occupation?
The highest level of education that I have completed is
high school ___________
baccalaureate degree ____________
master's degree ___________
doctorate __________

10.

I would rate my familiarity with overall tax law on a
scale of one (very unfamiliar) to seven (very familiar)
as: (circle the appropriate rating below)
1
Very
unfamiliar

11.

2

3

4

5

6

Neutral

7
Very
familiar

I would rate my familiarity with spacific tax laws that
affect me on a scale of one (very unfamiliar) to seven
(very familiar) as: (circle the appropriate rating below)
1
Very
unfamiliar

2

3

4

Neutral

5

6

7
Very
familiar
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Please detatch this page to preserve the anonymity of
your responses, sign it, and turn it in.

I realize that all information furnished, the potential
tax savings presented, and the impact of proposed
legislation on my 1995 tax status were purely hypothetical
and do not constitute tax advice or filing recommendations.
This study's purpose is primarily to learn about taxpayer
responses to the types of tax law changes now pending.

Signed:

VITA
Phyllis V. Copeland, CPA, a native of New Orleans,
Louisiana, received a bachelor of science in mathematics and
a master of science in accounting (taxation) from the
University of New Orleans.

After numerous years combined

professional experience in industry, public accounting, and
academe, she entered the doctoral program at the Louisiana
State University.

Copeland completed the program in 1995,

receiving a doctor of philosophy degree in accounting with a
finance concentration and a minor in experimental
statistics.
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